Results 251 to 260 of about 31,674 (299)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Phenomenal Intentionality and Intentionality Holism
ProtoSociology, 2023A number of philosophers, ourselves included, advocate the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis, which asserts that the fundamental kind of intentionality or aboutness is the intentionality of occurrent conscious states or processes. We take this to imply that phenomenal intentionality is both intrinsic and basic. We ourselves also maintain that phenomenal
Terry Horgan, John Tienson
openaire +1 more source
Intentionalism and Intransitivity
Synthese, 2005I argue in this paper that the existence of ‘sorites series’ of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal character as is not a transitive relation.
openaire +3 more sources
Synthese, 1999
Dans le cadre du debat scientifique sur la conception physicaliste des qualias, l'A. defend la these intentionnaliste de l'apparence phenomenale des couleurs, en particulier, et des caracteristiques qualitatives de l'experience perceptive, en general. Rejetant la forme intentionnaliste de l'internalisme des qualias, l'A.
openaire +1 more source
Dans le cadre du debat scientifique sur la conception physicaliste des qualias, l'A. defend la these intentionnaliste de l'apparence phenomenale des couleurs, en particulier, et des caracteristiques qualitatives de l'experience perceptive, en general. Rejetant la forme intentionnaliste de l'internalisme des qualias, l'A.
openaire +1 more source
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2006
Chapter 3 offers a proposal about the kind of content that memories have. According to this proposal, memories are self-referential in that they represent their own causal origin. A memory represents that it causally originates in a perception of an objective fact.
openaire +2 more sources
Chapter 3 offers a proposal about the kind of content that memories have. According to this proposal, memories are self-referential in that they represent their own causal origin. A memory represents that it causally originates in a perception of an objective fact.
openaire +2 more sources
Developmental Science, 2006
Abstract We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social‐cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill – as exemplified most clearly in the behavior
Michael, Tomasello, Malinda, Carpenter
openaire +2 more sources
Abstract We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social‐cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill – as exemplified most clearly in the behavior
Michael, Tomasello, Malinda, Carpenter
openaire +2 more sources
Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?
Axiomathes, 2021This paper addresses the title question and provides an argument for the conclusion that so-called phenomenal intentionality, in both its relational and non-relational construals, cannot be identified with intentionality meant as the property for a mental state to be about something.
openaire +2 more sources
Hard Problems of Intentionality
Philosophia (United States), 2015 This paper argues that Hutto and Satne’s three-pronged attempt to solve the problem of intentionality – or, at least, to provide an outline of how this problem should be approached – suffers from two shortcomings.
Rowlands, Marc
exaly +2 more sources
Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality
Monist, 2013I will focus here on the following questions. (1) What constitutes the most fundamental kind of semantic content in thought and language, the kind of content sometimes called Original intentionality'? (2) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality, solely by virtue of the functional roles played by their internal states ...
openaire +1 more source
Synthese, 2015
According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation.
openaire +1 more source
According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation.
openaire +1 more source
Mediaeval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality
Quaestio, 2010Wilfrid Sellars charged that mediaeval philosophers confused the genuine intentionality of thinking with what he called the “pseudo-intentionality” of sensing. I argue that Sellars’s charge rests on importing a form of mind/body dualism that was foreign to the Middle Ages, but that he does touch on a genuine difficulty for mediaeval theories, namely ...
openaire +1 more source