Results 251 to 260 of about 158,845 (295)
, 2012 Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality
Monist, 2013I will focus here on the following questions. (1) What constitutes the most fundamental kind of semantic content in thought and language, the kind of content sometimes called Original intentionality'? (2) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality, solely by virtue of the functional roles played by their internal states ...
openaire +1 more source
2005
Preface List of Abbreviations One: Laird ADDIS: The Necessity and Nature of Mental Contents Two: Philip J. BARTOK: Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental Three: William FISH: Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality Four: Gabor FORRAI: Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents Five: Jussi HAUKIOJA: Normativity and Mental Content Six: Greg JESSON ...
Gábor Forrai, George Kampis
openaire +2 more sources
Preface List of Abbreviations One: Laird ADDIS: The Necessity and Nature of Mental Contents Two: Philip J. BARTOK: Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental Three: William FISH: Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality Four: Gabor FORRAI: Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents Five: Jussi HAUKIOJA: Normativity and Mental Content Six: Greg JESSON ...
Gábor Forrai, George Kampis
openaire +2 more sources
Mediaeval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality
Quaestio, 2010Wilfrid Sellars charged that mediaeval philosophers confused the genuine intentionality of thinking with what he called the “pseudo-intentionality” of sensing. I argue that Sellars’s charge rests on importing a form of mind/body dualism that was foreign to the Middle Ages, but that he does touch on a genuine difficulty for mediaeval theories, namely ...
openaire +1 more source
Abstract This chapter focuses on intentionality itself, that is, on the nature of the contact between subject and object. It explores and commends a tradition which construes intentionality as intrinsically relational, contra some present-day views which understand intentionality as a non-relational mental representation (7.1).
+5 more sources
+5 more sources
2011
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
openaire +1 more source
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
openaire +1 more source
2009
Abstract Hume's chief weapon against causal realism is the argument from nonsense: for a view even to be a candidate for being right, it must first be intelligible to us. This chapter argues that, while Hume is not a positivist or verificationist, his account of intentionality, and in particular his denial of meaning to definite ...
openaire +1 more source
Abstract Hume's chief weapon against causal realism is the argument from nonsense: for a view even to be a candidate for being right, it must first be intelligible to us. This chapter argues that, while Hume is not a positivist or verificationist, his account of intentionality, and in particular his denial of meaning to definite ...
openaire +1 more source
Shared intentionality, reason-giving and the evolution of human culture
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2022Cathal O'Madagain, Michael Tomasello
exaly