Results 221 to 230 of about 24,384 (260)

International Environmental Agreements with reference points

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2014
Whether or not the current climate talks achieve a meaningful treaty, the current negotiation forms important reference points for future negotiations. In this paper, we introduce reference points to a canonical model of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs).
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International Environmental Agreements

2005
AbstractThis chapter explains why international agreements have increasingly been used to address international cooperation problems. It outlines the process of treaty making, and explains how process can shape outcomes. It then details the key features of treaties, such as the minimum participation level, basic obligations, withdrawal, and the use of ...
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Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements

Oxford Economic Papers, 1994
Effective management of international environmental resources requires cooperation, and in practice cooperation is usually codified in international environmental agreements (IEAs). The essential feature of IEAs is that they cannot be enforced by a third party. This paper explores the properties of self-enforcing IEAs using two models.
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Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA.
Nahid Masoudi, Georges Zaccour
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International environmental agreements and asymmetric information

1997
The paper explores the effect of asymmetric information on international environmental agreements.
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Overlapping International Environmental Agreements

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2015
The perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping coalitions in equilibrium. We study the efficiency and stability properties of environmental agreements to control emissions of correlated continental and global pollutants.
Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, Xie Zhu
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The effectiveness of international environmental agreements

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2012
Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution.
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Asymmetries in international environmental agreements

Environment and Development Economics, 2012
AbstractThis paper considers self-enforcing international environmental agreements when countries are asymmetric with respect to emission-related benefits and environmental damage. Considering these asymmetries simultaneously yields large stable coalitions, also without the option of transfers between signatories. However, these large stable coalitions
Pavlova, Yulia, de Zeeuw, Aart
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Formation of International Environmental Agreements and Payoff Allocation

Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costlyefforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far beenelusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the othersdo the effort and benefit itself from a better environment.
Michel Grabisch, Elena Parilina, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Georges Zaccour   +3 more
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Formation of International Environmental Agreements

1994
We study the formation of emission abatement coalitions. A necessary condition for a coalition to be viable is that all of its members are net gainers. For this to happen, a coalition has to be at least of a certain size, the minimum critical size. We show that if there are fixed costs associated with abatement programs, or if there are “reinforcement ...
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