Results 1 to 10 of about 75,086 (45)

Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination [PDF]

open access: yesSocial Science Research Network, 2023
Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the
Srinivas Arigapudi   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

open access: yesAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023
We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about.
David Cooper, J. Kagel
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

open access: yesAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of ...
Kiryl Khalmetski, Dirk Sliwka
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

open access: yes, 2010
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria.
D. Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions

open access: yesSocial Science Research Network
How does information about players’ intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions.
Marco Lambrecht   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence

open access: yesSocial Science Research Network, 2023
The experimental literature on repeated games has largely focused on settings where players discount the future identically. In applications, however, interactions often occur between players whose time preferences differ.
Marina Agranov   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Behavioural Responses to Unfair Institutions: Experimental Evidence on Rule Compliance, Norm Polarisation, and Trust

open access: yesSocial Science Research Network, 2023
IZA DP No. 16346 JULY 2023 Behavioural Responses to Unfair Institutions: Experimental Evidence on Rule Compliance, Norm Polarisation, and Trust* This study investigates the effects of unfair enforcement of institutional rules on public good contributions,
Simon Columbus   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Rotten Apples and Sterling Examples: Norm-Based Moral Reasoning and Peer Influences on Honesty

open access: yesJournal of Management Accounting Research
We develop a general norm-dependent utility function with disutility for actions that are inferior or superior to a norm. We test its validity by assessing the moderating role of norm sensitivity in explaining responses to peer influences in a budget ...
Steven Huddart, Hong Qu
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games

open access: yes, 2011
One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes.
Steffen Andersen   +4 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

open access: yesThe American Economic Review, 2015
We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects’ strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring.
Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume Fréchette
semanticscholar   +1 more source

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