Results 1 to 10 of about 82,268 (49)

Cautious belief and iterated admissibility [PDF]

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of"cautious rationality and common cautious ...
Emiliano Catonini, Nicodemo De Vito
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination [PDF]

Social Science Research Network, 2023
Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the
Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Amnon Schreiber   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023
We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about.
David Cooper, J. Kagel
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

The American Economic Review, 2019
We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects’ strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring.
P. Bó, Guillaume R. Fréchette
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Social Science Research Network
We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others.
D. Gill, Yaroslav Rosokha
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

, 2012
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria.
D. Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Coordination and free-riding problems in the provision of multiple public goods

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023
This study considers the twin problems of free riding and coordination failure prevailing in the provision of multiple public goods with diminishing marginal returns in which the payoff-sum maximising Pareto optimal outcome requires less-than-full ...
Ai Takeuchi, E. Seki
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Leaders and social norms: On the emergence of consensus or conflict

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
We propose a model where competing group leaders influence the social norm adopted in their group constrained by the norm being individually optimal for their members.
Juan I. Block, Rohan Dutta, D. Levine
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of ...
Kiryl Khalmetski, Dirk Sliwka
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Strategic default in financial networks

Games Econ. Behav., 2023
This paper investigates a model of strategic interactions in financial networks, where the decision by one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape default.
N. Allouch, M. Jalloul, Alfred Duncan
semanticscholar   +1 more source