Results 1 to 10 of about 74,790 (43)
Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination [PDF]
Social Science Research Network, 2023 Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the
Srinivas Arigapudi +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023 We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about.
David Cooper, J. Kagel
semanticscholar +1 more source
Dynamic Price Competition: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets
Social Science Research Network, 2022 We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential equations.
Ali Hortaçsu +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making.
Riccardo Ghidoni, S. Suetens
semanticscholar +1 more source
Strategic Observational Learning [PDF]
Social Science Research Network, 2022 . We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience.
Dimitri Migrow
semanticscholar +1 more source
Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2020 A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information.
Jacopo Bizzotto +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique
The American Economic Review, 2019 Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse.
A. Armand +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science, 2021 We study a dynamic principal-agent relationship with adverse selection and limited commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the principal may be able to improve her value over time by progressively learning the ...
Juan Ortner
semanticscholar +1 more source
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
, 2010 We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria.
D. Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber
semanticscholar +1 more source
Biased-Belief Equilibrium [PDF]
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019 We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player’s beliefs ...
Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source