Results 11 to 20 of about 74,790 (43)
Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions
How does information about players’ intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions.
Marco Lambrecht +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
On Communication and Collusion
We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler's (1964) model of repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither the prices nor the sales of their rivals.
Yu Awaya, V. Krishna
semanticscholar +1 more source
Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects’ strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring.
Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume Fréchette
semanticscholar +1 more source
Trade and Trees: How Trade Agreements Can Motivate Conservation Instead of Depletion
International trade and natural resource exploitation interact in multiple ways. This paper first presents a dynamic game in which the South (S) exploits (e.g., deforests) in order to export (e.g., lumber and agricultural products).
Bård Harstad
semanticscholar +1 more source
Transition Dynamics in Equilibrium Search
We study a dynamic equilibrium search model where sellers differ in their urgency to liquidate an asset. Buyers strategically make price offers without knowing a given seller’s urgency.
Ş. Akın, Brennan C. Platt
semanticscholar +1 more source
Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others.
D. Gill, Yaroslav Rosokha
semanticscholar +1 more source
Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks
We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we show that majority play shifts either if fundamentals ...
S. Morris, Muhamet Yildiz
semanticscholar +1 more source
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information ...
semanticscholar +1 more source
Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding
We study a dynamic contribution game where investors seek private benefits offered in exchange for contributions, and a single, publicly minded donor values project success. We show that donor contributions serve as costly signals that encourage socially
Joyee Deb, Aniko Oery, Kevin R. Williams
semanticscholar +1 more source
Partners or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, and the Choice of Scale of Interaction
We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could ...
M. Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
semanticscholar +1 more source

