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The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
, 2011 P. Bó, Guillaume Fréchette
semanticscholar +1 more source
Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts
, 2010 Sylvain Chassang
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Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future
, 2009 Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
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The Evolution of Strategic Sophistication
, 2016 Nikolaus Robalino, A. Robson
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Trust, reciprocity and favors in cooperative relationships
, 2013 Atila Abdulkadiroglu, K. Bagwell
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The American Economic Review, 2023
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection.
A. Wolitzky
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I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection.
A. Wolitzky
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The Effects of Time Preferences on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of ...
Jeongbin Kim
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The American Economic Review, 2023
This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multistage games.
Meng-Jhang Fong +2 more
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This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multistage games.
Meng-Jhang Fong +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
, 2020
We study the complexity of rules by paying experimental subjects to implement a series of algorithms and then eliciting their willingness-to-pay to avoid implementing them again in the future.
Ryan Oprea
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We study the complexity of rules by paying experimental subjects to implement a series of algorithms and then eliciting their willingness-to-pay to avoid implementing them again in the future.
Ryan Oprea
semanticscholar +1 more source