Results 1 to 10 of about 82,380 (48)
Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
The American Economic Review, 2023 Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly ...
David Delacrétaz +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination [PDF]
Social Science Research Network, 2023 Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the
Srinivas Arigapudi +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2022 Using novel data on peerage marriages in Britain, I find that low search costs and marriage-market segregation can generate sorting. Peers courted in the London Season, a matching technology introducing aristocratic bachelors to debutantes.
M. Goñi
semanticscholar +1 more source
Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information [PDF]
Social Science Research Network, 2021 We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion
Marcelo Ariel Fernandez +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications
The American Economic Review, 2019 It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to ...
Matthias Doepke, F. Kindermann
semanticscholar +1 more source
Initiating free-flow communication in trust games
Frontiers in Behavioral Economics, 2023 Theory suggests a first-mover advantage in many strategic bargaining situations, yet often the first to make an offer is not the first to communicate.
Emmanuel Dechenaux +4 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets
The American Economic Review, 2020 We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A central idea is to formulate off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations and on-path beliefs in the absence of such deviations.
Qingmin Liu
semanticscholar +1 more source
Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
Economic Journal, 2022 A matching market often requires recruiting agents, or ‘programmes,’ to costly screen ‘applicants,’ and congestion increases with the number of applicants to be screened.
YingHua He, T. Magnac
semanticscholar +1 more source
Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis
The American Economic Review, 2015 This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions ...
Guillaume R. Fréchette +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2020 This paper empirically examines recently declassified tariff bargaining data from the GATT/WTO. Focusing on the Torquay Round (1950–1951), we document stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations that suggest a lack of
K. Bagwell, R. Staiger, Ali Yurukoglu
semanticscholar +1 more source