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Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature

The American Economic Review, 2023
We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals.
Attila Ambrus   +14 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Games Played by Teams of Players

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022
We develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic ...
Jeongbin Kim   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Voting Power of Citizens in a Democracy

Arthaniti-Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2023
Shapley and Shubik in 1954 proposed an index to measure the relative voting power of members of a decision-making body, given their weights in the said body.
Aakash Gupta
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Full Implementation under Ambiguity

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021
This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and ...
Huiyi Guo, N. Yannelis
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022
We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a “left-right” axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed?
Andreas Kleiner, B. Moldovanu
semanticscholar   +1 more source

A Review of Robert Sugden’s Community of Advantage

Journal of Economic Literature, 2022
In his book, The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist’s Defence of the Market, Robert Sugden says that people should be left alone to do what they want. We interpret his reasons for saying so and try to unify them.
Patrick Harless, Romans Pancs
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty

Social Science Research Network, 2022
In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high.
Marina Agranov   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment.
Topi Miettinen, C. Vanberg
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Price and Choose

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for ...
Federico Echenique, Matías Núñez
semanticscholar   +1 more source

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