Results 21 to 30 of about 74,567 (47)

ESG Disclosure, Market Forces, and Investment Efficiency

Social Science Research Network
This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is
Hao Xue
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

The American Economic Review
While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—
Hector Chade
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Monitoring Team Members: Information Waste and the Transparency Trap

Social Science Research Network
In a model of moral hazard in teams, we demonstrate that firms' concerns about low trust among teammates can justify two common but otherwise puzzling patterns: information waste and transparency trap.
Matteo Camboni, Michael Porcellacchia
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Do Ordeals Work for Selection Markets? Evidence from Health Insurance Auto-Enrollment

The American Economic Review
Are application hassles, or “ordeals,” an effective way to limit public program enrollment? We provide new evidence by studying (removal of) an auto-enrollment policy for health insurance, adding an extra step to enroll.
Mark Shepard, Myles Wagner
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting.
Ryo Shirakawa
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors

The American Economic Review
We use the tools of mechanism design combined with the theory of risk measures to analyze how a cash-constrained owner of an asset with known, stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors who differ in their risk aversion and budget ...
Alex Gershkov, B. Moldovanu, P. Strack, Mengxi Zhang   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Nested Bundling

The American Economic Review
A nested bundling strategy creates menus in which more expensive bundles include all the goods of less expensive ones. We study when nested bundling is optimal and determine which nested menu is optimal, when consumers differ in one dimension.
Frank Yang
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Social Connectedness in Bank Lending

The Review of financial studies
We present evidence that loan allocations and loan terms are closely linked to the strength of social connections between bank and borrower regions.
Oliver Rehbein, Simon C. Rother
semanticscholar   +1 more source

A Theory of Fair CEO Pay

Social Science Research Network
This paper studies executive pay with fairness concerns: If the CEO's wage falls below a perceived fair share of output, he suffers disutility that is increasing in the discrepancy.
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, D. Gottlieb   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Panics and Early Warnings

Journal of Political Economy
We show how early warning about an impending regime change eliminates panic. Agents anticipate a future shock and decide when to attack. Waiting is costly, especially when others attack and cause a regime change while one waits. This may create panic. We
Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou
semanticscholar   +1 more source