Results 21 to 30 of about 72,464 (48)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
An Alternative Explanation for the “Fed Information Effect”
The American Economic Review, 2023Regressions of private-sector macroeconomic forecast revisions on monetary policy surprises often produce coefficients with signs opposite to standard macroeconomic models.
Michael D. Bauer, Eric T Swanson
semanticscholar +1 more source
Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
The American Economic Review, 2022Identifying high-growth microentrepreneurs in low-income countries remains a challenge due to a scarcity of verifiable information. With a cash grant experiment in India we demonstrate that community knowledge can help target high-growth ...
Reshmaan N. Hussam+2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Journal of Economic Literature, 2017Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players.
D. Bergemann, S. Morris
semanticscholar +1 more source
Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
The American Economic ReviewWhile many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—
Hector Chade
semanticscholar +1 more source
Welfare Comparisons for Biased Learning
The American Economic ReviewWe study robust welfare comparisons of learning biases (misspecified Bayesian and some forms of non-Bayesian updating). Given a true signal distribution, we deem one bias more harmful than another if it yields lower objective expected payoffs in all ...
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Y. Ishii
semanticscholar +1 more source
The Gender Gap in Confidence: Expected But Not Accounted For
Social Science Research NetworkWe investigate how the gender gap in confidence affects the views that evaluators (e.g., employers) hold about men and women. We find the confidence gap is contagious, causing evaluators to form overly pessimistic beliefs about women.
C. Exley, Kirby Nielsen
semanticscholar +1 more source
Robustness and Linear Contracts
, 2015We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist.
Gabriel D. Carroll
semanticscholar +1 more source
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023
This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of
Ron Siegel, Bruno H. Strulovici
semanticscholar +1 more source
This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of
Ron Siegel, Bruno H. Strulovici
semanticscholar +1 more source
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint ...
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint ...
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source
Nobel Lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations
The American Economic Review, 2023Credit markets, including the market for bank loans, are characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information. These informational frictions can interact with other economic forces to produce periods of credit-market stress, in which intermediation is ...
Ben S. Bernanke
semanticscholar +1 more source