Results 21 to 30 of about 81,718 (48)

Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination

Social Science Research Network
A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves.
Leonie Baumann, Rohan Dutta
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Sequential Learning under Informational Ambiguity

The American Economic Review
This paper investigates a sequential social learning problem in which individuals face ambiguity about others’ signal structures and have max-min expected utility preferences, thereby exhibiting ambiguity aversion. Unlike previous findings, which suggest
J. Chen
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies

The American Economic Review
We study the effects of intensifying competition for contracts in the context of US Defense procurement. Leveraging a discontinuous regulation that mandates agencies to publicize certain contract opportunities, we document that expanding the set of ...
R. Carril, Andrés González-Lira, M. S. Walker   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Learning to Disclose: Disclosure Dynamics in the 1890s Streetcar Industry

The Review of financial studies
We study the influence of bounded rationality on companies’ disclosure to investors in new industries. Using a historical example of a new industry, we document that several companies initially withheld their earnings, despite external capital needs ...
Thomas Bourveau, Matthias Breuer, Robert Stoumbos   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Price Information, Inter-Village Networks, and 'Bargaining Spillovers': Experimental Evidence from Ghana

Social Science Research Network, 2023
This paper presents results from a randomized experiment designed to evaluate the impact of providing commodity price information to farmers in rural Ghana.
Emilia Soldani, N. Hildebrandt, Yaw Nyarko, Giorgia Romagnoli   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Do Ordeals Work for Selection Markets? Evidence from Health Insurance Auto-Enrollment

The American Economic Review
Are application hassles, or “ordeals,” an effective way to limit public program enrollment? We provide new evidence by studying (removal of) an auto-enrollment policy for health insurance, adding an extra step to enroll.
Mark Shepard, Myles Wagner
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Nested Bundling

The American Economic Review
A nested bundling strategy creates menus in which more expensive bundles include all the goods of less expensive ones. We study when nested bundling is optimal and determine which nested menu is optimal, when consumers differ in one dimension.
Frank Yang
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Monitoring Team Members: Information Waste and the Transparency Trap

Social Science Research Network
In a model of moral hazard in teams, we demonstrate that firms' concerns about low trust among teammates can justify two common but otherwise puzzling patterns: information waste and transparency trap.
Matteo Camboni, Michael Porcellacchia
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting.
Ryoji Shirakawa
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors

The American Economic Review
We use the tools of mechanism design combined with the theory of risk measures to analyze how a cash-constrained owner of an asset with known, stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors who differ in their risk aversion and budget ...
Alex Gershkov, B. Moldovanu, P. Strack, Mengxi Zhang   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source