Results 21 to 30 of about 82,448 (48)
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Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: Evidence from Independent Directors’ Voting
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2022Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) is one of the most controversial and least understood governance tools. Using manually collected voting data for all director types, we provide the first evidence for the impact of D&O ...
Tianshi Li, Tina Yang, Jigao Zhu
semanticscholar +1 more source
Understanding the Ownership Structure of Corporate Bonds
Social Science Research Network, 2022Insurers are the largest institutional investors of corporate bonds. However, a standard theory of insurance markets, in which insurers maximize firm value subject to regulatory or risk constraints, predicts no allocation to corporate bonds.
Ralph S. J. Koijen, Motohiro Yogo
semanticscholar +1 more source
Risk Aversion and Insurance Propensity
The American Economic Review, 2023We provide a new foundation of risk aversion by showing that this attitude is fully captured by the propensity to seize insurance opportunities. In our main results, we first characterize Arrow-Pratt (1963–1964) risk aversion in terms of propensity to ...
F. Maccheroni +3 more
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Institutional Corporate Bond Pricing
The Review of financial studiesWe propose an equilibrium corporate bond pricing model that accommodates the heterogeneity in institutional investors’ preferences and mandates in an empirically tractable way.
Lorenzo Bretscher +3 more
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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Provider payments are the key determinant of insurance generosity within many health insurance programs covering low-income populations. This paper analyzes a large, federally mandated provider payment increase for primary care services provided to low ...
Marika Cabral +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Provider payments are the key determinant of insurance generosity within many health insurance programs covering low-income populations. This paper analyzes a large, federally mandated provider payment increase for primary care services provided to low ...
Marika Cabral +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Do Ordeals Work for Selection Markets? Evidence from Health Insurance Auto-Enrollment
The American Economic ReviewAre application hassles, or “ordeals,” an effective way to limit public program enrollment? We provide new evidence by studying (removal of) an auto-enrollment policy for health insurance, adding an extra step to enroll.
Mark Shepard, Myles Wagner
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Regulation Design in Insurance Markets
Social Science Research Network, 2023Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator restricts the menus of contracts an informed firm is permitted to offer,
D. Bhaskar, Andrew Mcclellan, E. Sadler
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Paying for Expertise: The Effect of Experience on Insurance Demand
Social Science Research NetworkMayers and Smith (1982) argue that one of the main reasons why corporations buy insurance is because insurers have a comparative advantage in providing real services, such as claims administration, monitoring, and loss prevention.
Vaibhav Anand +2 more
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Is Zero a Special Price? Evidence from Child Health Care
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2022Do consumers react differently to zero prices? We test the presence of a zero-price effect in child health care and find that a zero price is special as it boosts demand discontinuously.
Toshiaki Iizuka, H. Shigeoka
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Optimal Contract Regulation in Selection Markets
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsWe model competitive insurance markets with continuous cost-types. A regulator sets minimum and maximum coverage levels and a fee for nonbuyers. Equilibrium is unique if the type distribution is log-concave.
Yehuda John Levy, Andre Veiga
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