Results 191 to 200 of about 533,074 (361)

Quietist Elements in Adorno

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta‐philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in
Christian Lamp
wiley   +1 more source

No Self‐Reference, No Ownership?

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract A ‘no‐ownership’ or ‘no‐self theory’ holds that there is no proper subject of experience; the ownership of experience can only be accounted for by invoking a sub‐personal entity. In the recent self‐versus‐no‐self debate, it is widely assumed that the no‐referent view of ‘I’, which is closely associated with Wittgenstein and G. E. M.
Bernhard Ritter
wiley   +1 more source

The Threefold Essence of Consciousness: Brentano versus Pfänder

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Building on Uriah Kriegel's recent work on the varieties of consciousness, I consider the question of how many irreducible and fundamental kinds of consciousness there are. This is the project of a fundamental classification of consciousness (C‐taxonomy), which will be approached with reference to two figures from the (early) phenomenological ...
Christopher Erhard
wiley   +1 more source

Recognizability and recognition as human—Learning from Butler and Manne

open access: yesJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 579-594, December 2022., 2022
Abstract Judith Butler and Kate Manne shed, in different ways, doubt on the capacity of the recognition‐paradigm to comprehend phenomena of crucial ethical and political importance: whereas Butler argues that deeper than recognition are “frames” in light of which individuals and groups appear as recognizable human beings at all, Manne argues that too ...
Heikki Ikäheimo
wiley   +1 more source

Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract In The Imaginary Jean‐Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience ‐ I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim.
Jonathan Mitchell
wiley   +1 more source

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