Results 81 to 90 of about 16,014 (243)

Belief revision revised

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 2, Page 696-727, September 2025.
Abstract I outline a novel counterexample to the principle of belief revision, Anticipation: if both learning e$e$ and learning not‐e$e$ would render belief in p$p$ unjustified, you cannot now be justified in believing p$p$. If I am right, not only is the leading theory of belief revision false, so are various recently proposed weakenings.
Joshua Edward Pearson
wiley   +1 more source

A Criticism of Kripke’s Semantic for Intuitionistic Logic

open access: yesO Que Nos Faz Pensar, 2016
This note aims to examine critically Kripke’s semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic. Kripke’s semantic is extensionally correct with respect to propositional intuitionistic logic, that is, the calculus is sound and complete with respect to the
Wagner de Campos Sanz
doaj  

Book review: ALMOG, J. Referential Mechanics: Direct Reference and the Foundations of Semantics (Oxford University Press, 2014)

open access: yesManuscrito
: In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct reference as conceived by three of its founding fathers, Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan, and introduces Almog's ambitious project of providing a referential ...
Filipe Martone
doaj   +1 more source

Causal Theory of Reference of Saul Kripke [PDF]

open access: yes
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, language philosophy, mathematical philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and set theory.
Sfetcu, Nicolae
core  

Water Is and Is Not H2O, Depending on Who You Ask: Conceptualizations of Water Vary Across Chemists and Laypeople

open access: yesCognitive Science, Volume 49, Issue 8, August 2025.
Abstract Conceptual representations can be shaped by multiple factors, including expertise. In this study, we tested whether the concept of water is represented differently across laypeople and chemists, focusing on psychological essentialism. Essentialized categories are thought to be determined by internal factors (e.g., chemical composition ...
Claudia Mazzuca   +4 more
wiley   +1 more source

Completeness by Modal Definitions. Application to the Epistemic Logic With Hypotheses

open access: yesInteligencia Artificial, 2020
We investigate the variant of epistemic logic S5 for reasoning about knowledge under hypotheses. The logic is equipped with a modal operator of necessity that can be parameterized with a hypothesis representing background assumptions.
Levan Uridia, Dirk Walther
doaj   +1 more source

Completeness of Flat Coalgebraic Fixpoint Logics

open access: yes, 2010
Modal fixpoint logics traditionally play a central role in computer science, in particular in artificial intelligence and concurrency. The mu-calculus and its relatives are among the most expressive logics of this type.
Gastin, P.   +3 more
core   +1 more source

Conceptual engineering, language use, and the neutral implementation challenge

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 3-4, Page 373-388, July 2025.
Abstract Conceptual engineering projects have been targeted by what is known as the “implementation challenge,” which calls for an account of how it is possible to change meanings, given that we have no control over the complex ways in which meaning supervenes (for example) on patterns of use.
Delia Belleri
wiley   +1 more source

Social externalism and the implementation challenge: Revising socially and politically significant terms

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 3-4, Page 389-406, July 2025.
Abstract A central issue in conceptual engineering is the “implementation challenge”: the problem of how—or whether—conceptual revisions can be brought about, given our lack of control over the factors that determine meaning. Social externalism, which holds that semantic meaning is determined by the usage of experts within a linguistic community, seems
Isabella Bartoli
wiley   +1 more source

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