Results 1 to 10 of about 1,760 (238)
Limiting logical pluralism [PDF]
SynthÈse, 2019 AbstractIn this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited.
Suki Finn
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Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems [PDF]
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 2022 Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence.
Diego Tajer, Camillo Fiore
core +7 more sources
Logical Pluralism Hollandaise [PDF]
The Australasian Journal of Logic, 2008 Johan van Benthem compares and contrasts two research programmes, which he calls logical pluralism and logical dynamics, stating his ‘preference’ for the second of these ‘alternatives’. In this note I want to put the matter into a slightly different perspective.
Graham Priest
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Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic [PDF]
Inquiry, 2017 According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence.
Ferrari, Filippo, Moruzzi, Sebastiano
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Logical pluralism without the normativity
SynthÈse, 2018 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Gillian Russell +1 more
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A note on logical pluralism [PDF]
Filosofia Unisinos, 2016 In this paper we are going to characterize the idea of logical pluralism according to Beall and Restall. In order to do that, this paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we shall define briefly what Beall and Restall’s theory is about.
Villa, Alejandro, Alejandro Villa
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Logical dynamics meets logical pluralism? [PDF]
The Australasian Journal of Logic, 2008 Where is logic heading today? There is a general feeling that the discipline is broadening its scope and agenda beyond classical foundational issues, and maybe even a concern that, like Stephen Leacock’s famous horseman, it is ‘riding off madly in all directions’. So, what is the resultant vector? There seem to be two broad answers in circulation today.
van Benthem, J. +2 more
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Philosophia Mathematica, 2020 Abstract This chapter develops and motivates an alternative, more critical plural logic, thus exploring the third horn of the trilemma from the previous chapter. First, a liberal view of mathematical definitions is defended, according to which any objects can be used to define a set. This entails that the traditional plural comprehension
Salvatore Florio, Øystein Linnebo
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, 2017 Many natural languages contain plural vocabulary such as ‘we’, ‘those’, ‘the philosophers’, ‘cooperate’, and ‘gathered’. What is the correct logical analysis of sentences involving such vocabulary? Before we can attempt to answer the question, we need to comment briefly on how we understand logical analysis.
Linnebo, Øystein, Florio, Salvatore
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Logical space and the origins of pluralism in logic [PDF]
AUC PHILOSOPHICA ET HISTORICA, 2017 The fact that there is a plurality of systems that we call logics makes it requisite to attempt an explanation and thorough evaluation of the role of logic. I exploit the analogical development towards the pluralism of geometry to show that both disciplines are about some kinds of space which they explicate and that we can choose with some freedom the ...
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