Results 261 to 270 of about 2,574 (289)

Entrenched Management and the Adaptation Option

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
This paper examines whether firms with market values less than book values continue to exist because management does not want to utilize the adaptation option. If managers have the option to adapt assets (either internally or externally via selling the firm) to other uses when the expected net present value from current earnings is less than ...
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Potential effects of managers' entrenchment and shareholdings on competitiveness

European Journal of Operational Research, 1999
Abstract Previous studies on competitiveness have examined either broad macroeconomic factors such as financial/economic systems, infrastructure, exports and imports, and cultural/social values, or common microeconomic factors such as cost or product differentiation position, economies or scale/scope, and employee education and motivation as ...
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Social Economy Managers: Between Values and Entrenchment

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2004
Abstract Managers play a key rôle in Social Economy corporate governance and can determine the path that these companies will take. This article analyses the theoretical aspects underlying the central rôle of managers in Social Economy enterprises, the nature of these strategic human resources, particularly the variables that influence their behaviour,
Rafael Chaves, Antonia Sajardo‐Moreno
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Management Retention Following Poor Performance: Board Failure or Management Entrenchment

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
Acting in shareholders' best interests, the board of directors should remove top management when a firm performs poorly. However, empirical evidence indicates that sometimes boards replace top management and sometimes they do not. When top management is not replaced following poor performance, does this represent a failure of boards of directors and ...
Carolyn A. Carroll, John M. Griffith
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How do entrenched managers handle stakeholders interests?

Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 2012
Abstract This study examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on non-shareholding stakeholders. We find that managers tend to focus different levels of attention on specific non-shareholding stakeholders relative to their level of entrenchment.
Huimin Chung, Jane Raung Lin, Ying Sui Yang   +2 more
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Exposing the Corporate Vampires: a Shareholders Guide to Management Entrenchment

Long Range Planning, 1998
Abstract Two and a half years after this quote huge merger deals continue to dominate the business and general press headlines. Frequently the target company seeks to thwart the takeover attempt through numerous techniques. A fundamental question remains to be answered about these takeover events: How can a shareholder assess a firms techniques for ...
Richard R. Vecchiolla, Melanie Prudom, Robert D. Hamilton   +2 more
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Managers’ Entrenchment, Governance and Bank Performance

2017
This paper examines the relationship between managers’ entrenchment, governance and financial and stock market performance of Tunisian banking institutions listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange (TSE). We first propose to model the level of managers’ theoretical entrenchment.
MSELMİ, Aymen, REGAİEG, Boutheina
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Entrenched management, capital structure changes and firm value

Journal of Economics and Finance, 2008
The relationship between managerial share ownership and the firm’s change in leverage around a security issuance is examined. We find that entrenched managers are not more likely to issue equity, however they do affect lower leverage by choosing debt issuances which are smaller and equity issuances that are larger than those chosen by managers that are
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Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More? [PDF]

, 2005
Based on a two-million-observation panel dataset that matches public firms with detailed data on their employees, we find that entrenched managers pay their workers more. For example, our estimates show that CEOs with more control rights (votes) than all other blockholders together, pay their workers about 6%, or $2,200 per year, higher wages.
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The relationship between business strategy and management entrenchment

International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 2022
, Arash Arianpoor
exaly