Results 11 to 20 of about 1,416 (280)
When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased when explicit stakeholder protection is introduced so as to deprive incumbent CEOs of activists' support ...
Giovanni Cespa, Giacinta Cestone
openaire +4 more sources
MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT: SCALE VALIDATION
Objective: This work focused on the influence of managerial entrenchment on investment decisions. The objective was to understand the main characteristics of this variable in order to develop an instrument that could measure it.. Theoretical Framework: The decision-making process in finance is influenced by several factors related to the decision ...
Barbosa, Abigail Alves de Sousa +3 more
core +4 more sources
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance [PDF]
Abstract: We examine empirically the relationships amongst managerial entrenchment practices, social performance, and financial performance. We hypothesize that entrenched managers may collude with non‐shareholder stakeholders in order to reinforce their entrenchment strategy; this is particularly so in firms that have efficient internal control ...
Surroca Aguilar, Jorge +1 more
core +6 more sources
Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value: A Dynamic Perspective [PDF]
AbstractWe examine the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value using a dynamic model with firm fixed effects. To estimate the model, we employ the long-difference technique, which is shown by our simulation to deliver the least biased estimates. Based on a large sample of U.S. companies, we document a significantly negative and causal effect of
Chang, X, Zhang, HF
openaire +5 more sources
Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions [PDF]
ABSTRACTWe study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross‐sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring.
Berger, Philip G +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Moroccan Listed Companies
Purpose: Grounded in agency and entrenchment theories, this study assumes that CEOs’ propensity to entrench themselves can affect firm performance. The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between dimensions and mechanisms through ...
Mohamed Bousetta
doaj +2 more sources
Thesis on shareholder right and managerial entrenchment
This dissertation consists of two empirical essays on shareholder right and managerial entrenchment. The essays investigate how shareholder protections affect firm’s response to banking crisis, and how shareholder activism affects managerial voluntary disclosure. In the first essay, I assess the following question: Do stock markets act as a “spare tire”
Xie, Wensi, 解文斯
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Investigating the Relationship between Managerial Entrenchment and Internal Control Weakness (Operant Conditioning Behavior Theory Test) [PDF]
Purpose: In the shadow of separation of the ownership from the control and the problem of representation arising from it in the modern business world, there is a need to pay attention to the CEOs' approaches toward takeover as decision makers in this ...
Mostafa Maskani, Mohammadreza Abdoli
doaj +1 more source
Monitoring and managerial discretion effects on agency costs: Evidence from an emerging economy
We analyzed the effect of managerial ownership, leverage, and managerial discretion on the agency costs of 14,719 Chilean companies. The results of the instrumental variables (IV) regressions indicate that managerial ownership and capital structure have ...
Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment and Strategic Inertia [PDF]
ABSTRACTThis paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm's strategy is an important determinant of CEO compensation, turnover, and strategy change. A legacy makes CEO replacement expensive, because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager.
Casamatta, Catherine, Guembel, Alexander
openaire +2 more sources

