Results 271 to 280 of about 22,082 (308)
Managerial hedging and equity ownership [PDF]
, 2002 Riskaverse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash flow risk by trading in ficial markets, but cannot hedge their firmspecific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firmspecific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk.
Acharya, V, Bisin, A
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The Effect of Managerial Ownership and Institutional Ownership on Firm Value
In Search, 2020The main objective of this study is to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of managerial ownership and institutional ownership on firm value in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The data population was 154 manufacturing companies in the period 2015 - 2019.
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Managerial ownership and incentive alignment
2018Mandatory stock ownership plans require executives to hold a minimum level of stock. I exploit these changes in managerial stock ownership to examine the relation between managerial ownership and manager-shareholder incentive alignment. In contrast to prior work that suggests equity incentives induce opportunistic managerial behavior, I find earnings ...
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Managerial Ownership As An Incentive For Managerial Actions
2014Lately, the effect of firm size on managerial compensation becomes much poorer while compensations of top management team are associated mostly with the firm performance. Specifically, the use of stock options and other forms of deferred compensations puts the firms’ growth as the most important goal to managers because that is how they can exaggerate ...
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Corporate Ownership and Managerial Selection [PDF]
, 2009 data support the model predictions.
Fabiano Schivardi, Francesco Lippi
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Journal of Financial Economics, 2001
Abstract Himmelberg et al. (J. Financial Econom. 53 (1999) 353–384) argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. I show that managerial ownership, while substantially different across firms, typically changes slowly from year to year within a company.
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Abstract Himmelberg et al. (J. Financial Econom. 53 (1999) 353–384) argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. I show that managerial ownership, while substantially different across firms, typically changes slowly from year to year within a company.
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Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value [PDF]
, 2005 Riskaverse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to a firm's cash flow risk by trading in ficial markets, but cannot hedge their firmspecific exposure. This gives them incentives to load their firm's cash flows on aggregate risk, that is, to pass up firmspecific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater ...
Acharya, V, Bisin, A
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Ownership Design and Managerial Efficiency
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2022Pedro Makhoul +1 more
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Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership And Earning Management
International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (IJSRP), 2020openaire +1 more source
Managerial ownership and corporate financialization
Finance Research Letters, 2023Yongle Zhang +3 more
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