Results 1 to 10 of about 68,527 (180)

On the complexity of computing Markov perfect equilibrium in general-sum stochastic games. [PDF]

open access: greenNatl Sci Rev, 2023
ABSTRACTSimilar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Markov games (also called stochastic games) lay down the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning and sequential agent interactions. We introduce approximate Markov perfect equilibrium as a solution to the computational problem of finite-state ...
Deng X, Li N, Mguni D, Wang J, Yang Y.
europepmc   +11 more sources

Risk-sensitive Markov-perfect equilibrium [PDF]

open access: hybridAnnals of Operations Research
Abstract We investigate the existence and structure of Markov-perfect equilibria of discrete-time dynamic games in which players are risk averse and have time preferences consistent with discounting. We establish the existence of a Markov-perfect equilibrium when each player strives to maximize the expected exponential utility of the present ...
Madhvi Shinde Bhatt, Matthew J. Sobel
semanticscholar   +6 more sources

Globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium for discounted stochastic games and its application on intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks: Part I—theory [PDF]

open access: greenJapan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2019
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Debdas Ghosh   +4 more
semanticscholar   +8 more sources

Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential Games [PDF]

open access: goldDynamic Games and Applications, 2018
This paper revisits the problem of how to select an equilibrium in a differential game in the case of multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Most of the previous applied dynamic games literature has considered pre-play negotiations between players, implicitly or explicitly, with the aim of reaching an agreement on the selection of the pair of strategies. The
Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de   +1 more
semanticscholar   +5 more sources

Markov Quantal Response Equilibrium and a Homotopy Method for Computing and Selecting Markov Perfect Equilibria of Dynamic Stochastic Games [PDF]

open access: greenSSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter λ to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence are shown to be Markov perfect equilibria. Furthermore, the logit
Eibelshäuser, Steffen, Poensgen, David
semanticscholar   +4 more sources

Markov Perfect Equilibrium Existence for a Class of Undiscounted Infinite-Horizon Dynamic Games [PDF]

open access: greenJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Garcia, A., Smith, Robert L.
semanticscholar   +6 more sources

Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Discrete Choice Model and Innovator's dilemma under the Consumers' Preference Uncertainty

open access: bronzeJournal of Real Options and Strategy, 2009
This paper investigates the equilibrium investment policies of two different firms under customers’ preferences uncertainty. The incumbent firm, which owns a superior old technology, produces merchandise that can satisfy current customers at the beginning of the investment game.
J. Imai
semanticscholar   +4 more sources

Optimal tactics in community pension model for defined benefit pension plans. [PDF]

open access: yesPLoS ONE
Against the backdrop of an aging population, community pension initiatives are gaining traction, permeating societal landscapes. This study delves into the equilibrium strategy within the context of a defined benefit pension plan, employing a ...
Jun Wang, Chunli Cui, Tian Tian
doaj   +2 more sources

Stationary Markov Equilibrium Strategies in Asynchronous Stochastic Games: Existence and Computation

open access: yesAlgorithms
We study Asynchronous Dynamic games and show that in games with a finite state space and finite action sets, one can obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium by using a simple backward induction method when the time period for the game is ...
Subir. K. Chakrabarti   +2 more
doaj   +2 more sources

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