Results 1 to 10 of about 82 (66)
Domains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006 Abstract It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller, E., and Satterthwaite, M., (1977). The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness. J. Econ. Theory, 14 pp412–18.).
Koji Takamiya
+8 more sources
Maximal domains for strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic choice rules [PDF]
Meteor Research Memorandum, 2006 Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. To comprehend the limitations these results imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible.
A.J.A. Storcken, Olivier Bochet
+6 more sources
Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2009 The unequivocal majority of a social choice rule is a number of agents such that whenever at least this many agents agree on the top alternative, then this alternative (and only this) is chosen. The smaller the unequivocal majority is, the closer it is to the standard (and accepted) majority concept.
Pablo Amorós
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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules [PDF]
Review of Economic Design, 2008 Howard (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome ...
Haake, Claus-Jochen, Trockel, Walter
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Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008 Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. To comprehend the limitations these results imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible.
Bochet Olivier, Storcken Ton
openaire +8 more sources
Maskin-monotonic scoring rules [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2014 We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition.
Dogan, Battal, Koray, Semih
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Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences
Games, 2013 In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation.
Ahmed Doghmi
doaj +1 more source
Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?
Economic Inquiry, Volume 61, Issue 3, Page 720-737, July 2023., 2023 Abstract I compare two different systems of provision of binary public goods: a centralized system, operated by a benevolent government that has limited commitment power; and a decentralized system, based on voluntary contributions, where agents can communicate but cannot write contracts. I show that any ex‐post individually rational allocation that is
Francisco Silva
wiley +1 more source
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
Econometrica, Volume 91, Issue 4, Page 1495-1526, July 2023., 2023 We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the
Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan
wiley +1 more source
Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations
Econometrica, Volume 91, Issue 4, Page 1171-1203, July 2023., 2023 We combine personnel records of the United States federal bureaucracy from 1997 to 2019 with administrative voter registration data to study how ideological alignment between politicians and bureaucrats affects turnover and performance. We document significant partisan cycles and turnover among political appointees.
Jörg L. Spenkuch, Edoardo Teso, Guo Xu
wiley +1 more source