Results 11 to 20 of about 2,609 (100)
Set-Monotonicity Implies Kelly-Strategyproofness [PDF]
, 2014 This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former are preferred ...
Brandt, Felix
core +1 more source
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium [PDF]
, 2009 A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Mezzetti, Claudio, Renou, Ludovic
core +2 more sources
Rationalizable Implementation [PDF]
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
core +6 more sources
Should We Expect Merger Synergies to be Passed Through to Consumers?*
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 73, Issue 1, Page 1-30, March 2025.When reviewing horizontal mergers, antitrust agencies balance anticompetitive incentives, resulting from market power, with procompetitive incentives, created by efficiencies, assuming complete information and static, simultaneous move Nash equilibrium play.
Mario Leccese +2 more
wiley +1 more source
CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 1, Page 313-329, February 2025.Abstract We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to ...
Salvador Barberà +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Contractual Requirements and Bidding Behavior in Public Procurement With Entry
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2025.ABSTRACT We combine theoretical and empirical analyses to investigate the impacts of contractual requirements on bidding behavior and competition in procurement auctions with endogenous entry. Our analysis demonstrates that contractual requirements affect expected payoffs, influencing the equilibrium number of bidders and their bids under zero‐profit ...
Samielle Drake, Fei Xu
wiley +1 more source
Market transparency and consumer search—Evidence from the German retail gasoline market
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 55, Issue 4, Page 573-602, Winter 2024.Abstract We estimate a model of incomplete information price competition where consumers endogenously choose whether to use a price search website. We examine how consumer search and prices would change under different transparency regimes. We find that aggregate consumer welfare is maximized when the price search website lists the lowest 20% of prices
Simon Martin
wiley +1 more source
FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH
International Economic Review, Volume 65, Issue 4, Page 1821-1850, November 2024.Abstract A competition authority (CA) has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is repeatedly implementable if the firms cannot collude and deceive the CA in equilibrium.
Helmuts Āzacis, Péter Vida
wiley +1 more source
Extensive measurement in social choice
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 1581-1618, November 2024.Extensive measurement is the standard measurement‐theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a
Jacob M. Nebel
wiley +1 more source
Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 33, Issue 3, Page 509-538, Fall 2024.Abstract We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy—the principal, the prime‐agent and the subagent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime‐agent, who receives a report from the subagent.
Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz
wiley +1 more source