Results 11 to 20 of about 62 (48)
Motivation in All‐Pay Contests
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2026.ABSTRACT This paper studies how agents with monetary and non‐monetary motivation interact strategically in competitions. Examining the question under an all‐pay contest framework, we show that there do not exist pure‐strategy equilibria when the competing agents share the same motivation. When agents with different motivation compete against each other,
Yung‐Shiang Jasmine Yang
wiley +1 more source
Intangible intensity and between‐firm wage inequality
Economica, Volume 93, Issue 369, Page 209-229, January 2026.Abstract A substantial portion of the recent increase in wage inequality in advanced economies is attributed to the rise in between‐firm wage inequality. At the same time, growing empirical evidence shows a rising reliance on intangible assets in the production process. We demonstrate that these two trends are related.
Guido Pialli, Olga Tcaci
wiley +1 more source
Equilibrium Existence in First‐Price Auctions With Private Values
Econometrica, Volume 94, Issue 1, Page 193-224, January 2026.We provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence in first‐price auctions with private values that accommodate non quasi‐linear utilities and value‐distributions that contain atoms and exhibit positive or negative correlation. These conditions show that equilibrium existence often turns on properties of a single statistic of the joint ...
Wojciech Olszewski +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: The curse of profitability
Theoretical Economics, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 167-203, January 2026.We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to accrue some benefits if the remaining players keep contributing to the partnership. Players can strategically exit to free‐ride on their partners' contributions, knowing that it may trigger subsequent exits of
Boli Xu
wiley +1 more source
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 1285-1322, November 2025.Implementation theory is concerned with the existence of mechanisms in which, at each state of the world, all equilibria result in outcomes that are within a given social choice correspondence (SCC). However, if agents make mistakes, if their preferences or the solution concept are misspecified, or if the designer is limited in what can be used as ...
Malachy James Gavan, Antonio Penta
wiley +1 more source
Ordinal Simplicity in Discrete Mechanism Design
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1665-1680, October 2025.ABSTRACT In environments without transfers, market designers usually restrict attention to ordinal mechanisms. Ordinal mechanisms are simpler but miss potentially welfare‐relevant information. Under what conditions is it without loss to focus on ordinal mechanisms? We show that all group strategy‐proof mechanisms are ordinal.
Marek Pycia, M. Utku Ünver
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Should We Expect Merger Synergies to be Passed Through to Consumers?*
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 73, Issue 1, Page 1-30, March 2025.When reviewing horizontal mergers, antitrust agencies balance anticompetitive incentives, resulting from market power, with procompetitive incentives, created by efficiencies, assuming complete information and static, simultaneous move Nash equilibrium play.
Mario Leccese +2 more
wiley +1 more source
CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 1, Page 313-329, February 2025.Abstract We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to ...
Salvador Barberà +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Contractual Requirements and Bidding Behavior in Public Procurement With Entry
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2025.ABSTRACT We combine theoretical and empirical analyses to investigate the impacts of contractual requirements on bidding behavior and competition in procurement auctions with endogenous entry. Our analysis demonstrates that contractual requirements affect expected payoffs, influencing the equilibrium number of bidders and their bids under zero‐profit ...
Samielle Drake, Fei Xu
wiley +1 more source
Market transparency and consumer search—Evidence from the German retail gasoline market
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 55, Issue 4, Page 573-602, Winter 2024.Abstract We estimate a model of incomplete information price competition where consumers endogenously choose whether to use a price search website. We examine how consumer search and prices would change under different transparency regimes. We find that aggregate consumer welfare is maximized when the price search website lists the lowest 20% of prices
Simon Martin
wiley +1 more source