Results 21 to 30 of about 62 (48)
FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH
International Economic Review, Volume 65, Issue 4, Page 1821-1850, November 2024.Abstract A competition authority (CA) has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is repeatedly implementable if the firms cannot collude and deceive the CA in equilibrium.
Helmuts Āzacis, Péter Vida
wiley +1 more source
Extensive measurement in social choice
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 1581-1618, November 2024.Extensive measurement is the standard measurement‐theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a
Jacob M. Nebel
wiley +1 more source
Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 33, Issue 3, Page 509-538, Fall 2024.Abstract We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy—the principal, the prime‐agent and the subagent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime‐agent, who receives a report from the subagent.
Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz
wiley +1 more source
Robust contracts in common agency
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 55, Issue 2, Page 199-229, Summer 2024.Abstract Business activities often involve a common agent managing a variety of projects on behalf of investors with potentially conflicting interests. The extent of the agent's actions is also often unknown to investors, who have to design contracts that provide incentives to the manager despite this lack of crucial knowledge.
Keler Marku +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Certification Design With Common Values
Econometrica, Volume 92, Issue 3, Page 651-686, May 2024.This paper studies certification design and its implications for information disclosure. Our model features a profit‐maximizing certifier and the seller of a good of unknown quality. We allow for common values as the seller's opportunity cost may depend on the quality of the good.
Andreas Asseyer, Ran Weksler
wiley +1 more source
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 635-666, May 2024.Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy‐proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in ...
Yiqiu Chen, Markus Möller
wiley +1 more source
Individual preferences, government policy, and COVID-19: A game-theoretic epidemiological analysis. [PDF]
Appl Math Model, 2023 Zhou Y, Rahman MM, Khanam R, Taylor BR.
europepmc +1 more source
Design of Sponsored Search Auction Mechanism for Federated Learning Advertising Platform.
Comput Intell Neurosci, 2022 Jiang H, Cui T, Yang K.
europepmc +1 more source
Distributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange. [PDF]
Am Econ J Microecon, 2015 Benjamin DJ.
europepmc +1 more source
, 2009 Introducing the minimal Maskin monotonic extension of a social choicerule within some family of social choice rules, we define a family of socialchoice rules which certify to have a unique minimal Maskin monotonic ex-tension of these social choice rules within this family. So we characterizethe minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of q-Approval Fallback
openaire +2 more sources