Results 21 to 30 of about 2,609 (100)
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions [PDF]
, 2005 We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a ...
Kar, Anirban +2 more
core +3 more sources
Robust contracts in common agency
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 55, Issue 2, Page 199-229, Summer 2024.Abstract Business activities often involve a common agent managing a variety of projects on behalf of investors with potentially conflicting interests. The extent of the agent's actions is also often unknown to investors, who have to design contracts that provide incentives to the manager despite this lack of crucial knowledge.
Keler Marku +2 more
wiley +1 more source
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness [PDF]
, 2018 The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that
Bochet, Olivier, Klaus, Bettina
core
Certification Design With Common Values
Econometrica, Volume 92, Issue 3, Page 651-686, May 2024.This paper studies certification design and its implications for information disclosure. Our model features a profit‐maximizing certifier and the seller of a good of unknown quality. We allow for common values as the seller's opportunity cost may depend on the quality of the good.
Andreas Asseyer, Ran Weksler
wiley +1 more source
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions [PDF]
We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a ...
Anirban Kar +2 more
core +9 more sources
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 635-666, May 2024.Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy‐proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in ...
Yiqiu Chen, Markus Möller
wiley +1 more source
Direct implementation with evidence
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 783-822, May 2024.We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben‐Porath and Lipman (2012).
Soumen Banerjee +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 705-742, May 2024.This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete‐information, all‐pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize.
Shanglyu Deng +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 605-634, May 2024.We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and ...
Xu Lang, Debasis Mishra
wiley +1 more source
Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms [PDF]
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust ...
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
core +3 more sources