Results 31 to 40 of about 2,609 (100)
Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility
Economic Inquiry, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 308-328, January 2024.Abstract The paper examines how pre‐play communication between players with partial credibility affects the ensuing strategic interaction. We consider an environment where players are uncertain about the economic and psychological costs of reneging on promises but learn these at the time of their implementation.
Tigran Melkonyan, Surajeet Chakravarty
wiley +1 more source
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 449-498, January 2024.This paper explores how the persistence of past choices creates incentives in a continuous time stochastic game involving a large player (e.g., a firm) and a sequence of small players (e.g., customers). The large player faces moral hazard and her actions are distorted by a Brownian motion.
J. Aislinn Bohren
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Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 365-405, January 2024.We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability‐generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer‐term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short‐term gains.
César Barilla, Duarte Gonçalves
wiley +1 more source
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness [PDF]
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that
Bettina Klaus, Olivier Bochet
core
Explorations on monotonicity in social choice theory [PDF]
, 2007 Ankara : The Department of Economics, The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 2007.Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2007.Includes bibliographical references leaves 27.Due to Maskin (1977), Maskin-monotonicity is ...
Doğan, Battal
core
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium.
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
core
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium [PDF]
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou
core
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets [PDF]
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time.
Klaus, Bettina
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Individual preferences, government policy, and COVID-19: A game-theoretic epidemiological analysis. [PDF]
Appl Math Model, 2023 Zhou Y, Rahman MM, Khanam R, Taylor BR.
europepmc +1 more source
Nash implementable domains for the Borda count [PDF]
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic ...
Puppe, Clemens, Tasnádi, Attila
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