Results 41 to 50 of about 2,609 (100)

Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

, 2016
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for ...
Kunimoto, Takashi, Serrano, Roberto
core  

Principle-based non-monotonic reasoning - from humans to machines

, 2022
A key challenge when developing intelligent agents is to instill behavior into computing systems that can be considered as intelligent from a common-sense perspective. Such behavior requires agents to diverge from typical decision-making algorithms that strive to maximize simple and often one-dimensional metrics.
openaire   +1 more source

Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium [PDF]

This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents.
Karl H. Schlag, Ludovic Renou
core  

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples [PDF]

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable ...
Bettina Klaus, Claus-Jochen Haake
core   +3 more sources

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules [PDF]

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well.
Claus-Jochen Haake, Walter Trockel
core  

Strong implementation with partially honest individuals [PDF]

, 2018
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indifference ...
Savva, Foivos
core   +1 more source

A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation [PDF]

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive
Rajiv Vohra, Roberto Serrano
core  

Partnership-Enhancement and Stability in Matching Problems [PDF]

In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rankenhancements of partners.
Tadenuma, Koichi
core   +6 more sources

Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts [PDF]

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions.
Bettina Klaus, Claus-Jochen Haake
core  

Implementation with Evidence: Complete Information [PDF]

We study full-implementation in Nash equilibrium under complete information. We generalize the canonical model (Maskin, 1977) by allowing agents to send evidence or discriminatory signals.
Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux
core