Results 51 to 60 of about 2,609 (100)
Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms [PDF]
Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium ...
Bochet,Olivier
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Design of Sponsored Search Auction Mechanism for Federated Learning Advertising Platform.
Comput Intell Neurosci, 2022 Jiang H, Cui T, Yang K.
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Robust implementation under alternative information structures [PDF]
, 1991 In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbours and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the economy. We consider two different informational frameworks.
Corchón, Luis C., Ortuño, Ignacio
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Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules [PDF]
Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied.
Bochet, Olivier, Storcken, Ton
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Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence: The Boundary Problem [PDF]
Consider exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian correspondence is not Nash implementable.
Bochet,Olivier
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Monopoly, non-linear pricing, and imperfect information: a reconsideration of the insurance market [PDF]
, 2008 I reconsider Stiglitz's (1977) problem of monopolistic insurance with a continuum of types. Using a suitable transformation of control variables I obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal insurance policies.
Szalay, Dezsö
core
Distributional Preferences, Reciprocity-Like Behavior, and Efficiency in Bilateral Exchange. [PDF]
Am Econ J Microecon, 2015 Benjamin DJ.
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, 2009 Introducing the minimal Maskin monotonic extension of a social choicerule within some family of social choice rules, we define a family of socialchoice rules which certify to have a unique minimal Maskin monotonic ex-tension of these social choice rules within this family. So we characterizethe minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of q-Approval Fallback
openaire +2 more sources
The evolution and devolution of cognitive control: The costs of deliberation in a competitive world. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2015 Tomlin D, Rand DG, Ludvig EA, Cohen JD.
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Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners. [PDF]
J Theor Biol, 2012 Chatterjee K, Zufferey D, Nowak MA.
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