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A Critical Study: Physical Closure and the Argument for Naturalism [PDF]

open access: yesPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, 2021
Great naturalist philosophers like David Armstrong, David Papineau, Jeagwon Kim, and others have argued that the best arguments for naturalism are based on Physical Causal Closure (in brief P.C). P.C that is a premise in these arguments implies that only
Nima Narimani
doaj   +1 more source

Trope Mental Causation: Still Not Qua Mental

open access: yesErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2022
A popular solution to the causal exclusion problem in the non-reductive physicalist camp is the trope identity solution. But this solution is haunted by the “quausation problem” which charges that the trope only confers causal powers qua physical, not ...
Wenjun Zhang
doaj   +2 more sources

Mental Causation [PDF]

open access: yesAnalysis, 2014
How could mental entities causally affect, or be affected by, physical entities? Identifying a relationship between mental and physical entities that is both consistent with their causal interaction and independently plausible is one of the perennial problems in the philosophy of mind.
  +5 more sources

A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation

open access: yesTrans/Form/Ação, 2023
: Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho
doaj   +3 more sources

Mental Causation

open access: yes, 2018
Questo articolo si propone di fornire una breve panoramica del problema della causazione mentale e delle soluzioni proposte attualmente. La causazione mentale risulta infatti uno dei più difficili enigmi della filosofia della mente. Nelle prime due sezioni, offriamo una descrizione del problema e del dibattito filosofico su di esso, e mostriamo come il
Giorgi, Rodolfo, Lavazza, Andrea
  +8 more sources

Rationality, mental causation and social sciences [PDF]

open access: yesFilozofija i Društvo, 2009
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of mental causation in the context of rational choice theory. The author defends psychological aspect of rational explanation against the challenge of contemporary reductive materialism.
Mladenović Ivan
doaj   +1 more source

The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness

open access: yesEntropy, 2020
Mental causation is vitally important to the integrated information theory (IIT), which says consciousness exists since it is causally efficacious.
Matthew Owen
doaj   +1 more source

Lived experiences matter: The role of mental health professionals’ psychological crises and vulnerability in shaping their health beliefs and concepts

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychiatry, 2023
BackgroundMental health professionals are often affected by mental health problems and disorders. Yet, the effects of these lived experiences on their causal beliefs and health concepts have not been investigated.
Angel Ponew   +6 more
doaj   +1 more source

Can Neuroscientists Test a New Physicalist Mind/Body View: DiCoToP (Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism)?

open access: yesFrontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2021
Given that disparate mind/body views have interfered with interdisciplinary research in psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the mind/body problem itself is explored here. Adding a philosophy of mind framework, problems for both dualists and physicalists are
Linda A. W. Brakel   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Consciousness and its hard problems: separating the ontological from the evolutionary

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2023
Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant.
Thurston Lacalli
doaj   +1 more source

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