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SynthÈse, 2015
This paper argues that the exclusion problem for mental causation can be solved by a variant of non-reductive physicalism that takes the mental not merely to supervene on, but to be grounded in, the physical. A grounding relation between events can be used to establish a principle that links the causal relations of grounded events to those of grounding
Thomas Kroedel +2 more
exaly +2 more sources
This paper argues that the exclusion problem for mental causation can be solved by a variant of non-reductive physicalism that takes the mental not merely to supervene on, but to be grounded in, the physical. A grounding relation between events can be used to establish a principle that links the causal relations of grounded events to those of grounding
Thomas Kroedel +2 more
exaly +2 more sources
Mental causation as multiple causation
Philosophical Studies, 2007The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that ...
Thomas Kroedel
exaly +2 more sources
Disproportional mental causation
SynthÈse, 2010In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental ...
exaly +2 more sources
Mental causation as joint causation
Synthese, 2019This paper explores and defends the idea that mental properties and their physical bases jointly cause their physical effects. The paper evaluates the view as an emergentist response to the exclusion problem, comparing it with a competing nonreductive physicalist solution, the compatibilist solution, and argues that the joint causation view is more ...
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Think, 1999
When we explain someone's behaviour, we do so by appealing to their mental states – their beliefs, desires, and so on. But, as Fred Dretske explains below, materialists have a hard time explaining how our mental states could have any effect on our behaviour.
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When we explain someone's behaviour, we do so by appealing to their mental states – their beliefs, desires, and so on. But, as Fred Dretske explains below, materialists have a hard time explaining how our mental states could have any effect on our behaviour.
openaire +1 more source