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The mental representation of the meaning of words
Cognition, 1987Five phenomena concerning the meanings of words are outlined in this paper. They concern (1) our limited introspective access to the nature of lexical representations; (2) the existence of lexical entries that make accessible the sense of a word; (3) the effects of context on the interpretation of words; (4) the systematic gaps in the acquisition of ...
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Why there are no mental representations
Minds and Machines, 1991I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating.
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Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 2013 Frank C, Land WM, Schack T. Mental representation and learning: The influence of practice on the development of mental representation structure in complex action. Psychology of Sport and Exercise.
Cornelia Frank +2 more
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Mental Rotation, Mental Representation, and Flat Slopes
Cognitive Psychology, 1993The "mental rotation" literature has studied how subjects determine whether two stimuli that differ in orientation have the same handedness. This literature implies that subjects perform the task by imagining the rotation of one of the stimuli to the orientation of the other. This literature has spawned several theories of mental representation.
D, Cohen, M, Kubovy
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Mental representations of familiar faces
British Journal of Psychology, 2011The framework makes a number of important distinctions between the types of representation needed to recognize a familiar face. Here, we return to these, focussing particularly on face recognition units. We argue that such representations need to incorporate idiosyncratic within‐person variability, asking questions such as ‘What counts as a picture of
A Mike, Burton +2 more
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Dretske, representation, and the mental/non-mental distinction
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1993Abstract In Explaining Behavior, Dretske accepts the metaphysical doctrine that the representational properties of states such as belief must prove causally operative in generating output. Dretske's acceptance of this doctrine causes him to worry about how representational systems can be minds, and drives him to argue for a hierarchy of ...
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Mental representation and the discovery of new strategies
Strategic Management Journal, 2016Felipe A Csaszar, Daniel A Levinthal
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