Results 141 to 150 of about 325 (185)
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ARCHIMEDEAN METAETHICS DEFENDED
Metaphilosophy, 2008Abstract:We sometimes say our moral claims are “objectively true,” or are “right, even if nobody believes it.” These additional claims are often taken to be staking out metaethical positions, representative of a certain kind of theorizing about morality that “steps outside” the practice in order to comment on its status.
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Ethics, 1997
Critique de l'ouvrage de M. Smith intitule «The moral problem» (1994) qui, selon l'A., ne traite pas du probleme moral de la cruaute ou de l'injustice, mais du probleme metaethique de la pratique et de la theorie de la pensee morale. Soulignant la subtilite de l'analyse conceptuelle des trois theses cogntiviste, internaliste et psychologique chez Smith,
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Critique de l'ouvrage de M. Smith intitule «The moral problem» (1994) qui, selon l'A., ne traite pas du probleme moral de la cruaute ou de l'injustice, mais du probleme metaethique de la pratique et de la theorie de la pensee morale. Soulignant la subtilite de l'analyse conceptuelle des trois theses cogntiviste, internaliste et psychologique chez Smith,
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2019
This book develops a novel interpretation of the late-nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as holding a distinct and original metaethical position (a theory about our practice of ethics). David Emannuel Rowe characterizes it as a human-centered metaethics. A central achievement of A Nietzschean Metaethics is to bring Nietzsche into
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This book develops a novel interpretation of the late-nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as holding a distinct and original metaethical position (a theory about our practice of ethics). David Emannuel Rowe characterizes it as a human-centered metaethics. A central achievement of A Nietzschean Metaethics is to bring Nietzsche into
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2018
Some disagreements evoke philosophical angst: the judgment that the truth of some thesis is essential for the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, combined with the worry that it might be false. Chapter 1 develops an account of this attitude, its phenomenology, and its normative status in contrast to related attitudes ...
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Some disagreements evoke philosophical angst: the judgment that the truth of some thesis is essential for the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, combined with the worry that it might be false. Chapter 1 develops an account of this attitude, its phenomenology, and its normative status in contrast to related attitudes ...
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Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy
In this paper, I address what a Pyrrhonian moral skeptic would say about the ‘now what’ debate amongst another set of moral skeptics, moral error theorists. The ‘now what’ debate stems from the ways error theorists try to solve the ‘now what’ problem of deciding what to do with moral discourse once error theory is accepted.
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In this paper, I address what a Pyrrhonian moral skeptic would say about the ‘now what’ debate amongst another set of moral skeptics, moral error theorists. The ‘now what’ debate stems from the ways error theorists try to solve the ‘now what’ problem of deciding what to do with moral discourse once error theory is accepted.
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2019
Abstract Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s
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Abstract Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s
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