Results 221 to 230 of about 246,889 (292)
Beyond computational equivalence: the behavioral inference principle for machine consciousness. [PDF]
Palminteri S, Wu CM.
europepmc +1 more source
Why Are All the Sets All the Sets?
ABSTRACT Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets (de rebus) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur‐Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory.
Tim Button
wiley +1 more source
Aggregation and the Structure of Value
ABSTRACT Roughly, the view I call “Additivism” sums up value across time and people. Given some standard assumptions, I show that Additivism follows from two principles. The first says that how lives align in time cannot, in itself, matter. The second says, roughly, that a world cannot be better unless it is better within some period or another.
Weng Kin San
wiley +1 more source
Some Revelatory Insights from the Psalms for Catholic Medical Practice. [PDF]
Pugeda TGS.
europepmc +1 more source
No Guide to Ground: Right‐Making and Right‐Makers
ABSTRACT It is often taken for granted that right‐makers, that is, the things that make something—say, an action—right, do so by explaining why it is right. This view can be spelled out in terms of metaphysical ground: right‐making just is grounding of rightness facts.
Singa Behrens
wiley +1 more source
Anselm's Temporal‐Ontological Proof
ABSTRACT In his Reply to Gaunilo, Anselm presented two additional arguments for the existence of God beyond those that appear in the Proslogion. In “The Logical Structure of Anselm's Argument,” Robert M. Adams isolates each. One, he develops into a modal ontological argument along the lines of other 20th century ontological arguments (e.g., those of ...
Daniel Rubio
wiley +1 more source
An absurdist ethics of AI: applying Camus' concepts of rebellion and dignity to the challenges posed by disruptive technoscience. [PDF]
Kruizinga MV, Zwart H, Frissen V.
europepmc +1 more source
ABSTRACT Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a significant (if sometimes implicit) role in metaphysical theorizing. A philosopher will argue that a fact [p]$[p]$ contains a derivative entity and cite Purity as a reason to deny that [p]$[p]$ is fundamental. I argue that recent
Samuel Z. Elgin
wiley +1 more source

