Results 221 to 230 of about 246,889 (292)

Why Are All the Sets All the Sets?

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets (de rebus) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur‐Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory.
Tim Button
wiley   +1 more source

Aggregation and the Structure of Value

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Roughly, the view I call “Additivism” sums up value across time and people. Given some standard assumptions, I show that Additivism follows from two principles. The first says that how lives align in time cannot, in itself, matter. The second says, roughly, that a world cannot be better unless it is better within some period or another.
Weng Kin San
wiley   +1 more source

No Guide to Ground: Right‐Making and Right‐Makers

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT It is often taken for granted that right‐makers, that is, the things that make something—say, an action—right, do so by explaining why it is right. This view can be spelled out in terms of metaphysical ground: right‐making just is grounding of rightness facts.
Singa Behrens
wiley   +1 more source

Mereological Anti-Conservatism. [PDF]

open access: yesActa Anal
Declos A, Grandjean V.
europepmc   +1 more source

Anselm's Temporal‐Ontological Proof

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In his Reply to Gaunilo, Anselm presented two additional arguments for the existence of God beyond those that appear in the Proslogion. In “The Logical Structure of Anselm's Argument,” Robert M. Adams isolates each. One, he develops into a modal ontological argument along the lines of other 20th century ontological arguments (e.g., those of ...
Daniel Rubio
wiley   +1 more source

Unstructured Purity

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a significant (if sometimes implicit) role in metaphysical theorizing. A philosopher will argue that a fact [p]$[p]$ contains a derivative entity and cite Purity as a reason to deny that [p]$[p]$ is fundamental. I argue that recent
Samuel Z. Elgin
wiley   +1 more source

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