Results 181 to 190 of about 138,655 (209)
Referential Indeterminacy and De Re Thoughts
ABSTRACT Referential indeterminacy may seem to leave little room for de re or singular thoughts about ordinary objects. I argue that this impression is misleading. We can direct our thoughts at particular objects, even though there is no fact of the matter as to which objects are referred to by the singular terms purporting to stand for them.
Bahram Assadian
wiley +1 more source
ABSTRACT There is no precise characterization of the A‐ and B‐theories that has won a consensus in the literature. In this paper, we set out to provide clear formulations of these theories in the setting of higher‐order logic in what we call the operational framework.
Minjun Kang
wiley +1 more source
Order of Explanation: Having it Both Ways
ABSTRACT Order‐of‐explanation objections say that some philosophical view implies p$p$ because q$q$, when it's more natural to say that q$q$ because p$p$; and since such mirroring explanations are presumed to be incompatible, the targeted view must be in conflict with the intuitive explanation.
Kenneth Black
wiley +1 more source

