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Metaphysical realism and idealisation
Philosophia (United States), 1998L'A. propose une version du realisme metaphysique qui resiste aux critiques antirealistes formulees par H. Putnam. Examinant l'idee de representabilite parfaite du monde, ainsi que les notions de representation, proprietes naturelles et idealisation, d'une part, et mesurant le role de l'interpretation dans le langage d'une communaute linguistique ...
Cox Damian
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Metaphysical Realism and Anti-Realism
2022Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also (tend to) hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments.
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Idealistic Studies, 1974
Not so long ago I attended a conference of philosophers and politicians. I was introduced to one rather opinionated politician as one of the philosophers. He promptly asked me, ‘What sort of philosopher ?’ I turned the edge of this by replying rather tartly in turn, ‘Quite a good one, it is generally thought’.
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Not so long ago I attended a conference of philosophers and politicians. I was introduced to one rather opinionated politician as one of the philosophers. He promptly asked me, ‘What sort of philosopher ?’ I turned the edge of this by replying rather tartly in turn, ‘Quite a good one, it is generally thought’.
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2017
The central question I explore is to what extent realism should be metaphysically informed. On the one hand, if the realist eschews metaphysics she runs the risk of being accused of doing little more than regurgitating the relevant science; but on the other, if she accepts too much she runs the kind of epistemic risk associated with metaphysical ...
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The central question I explore is to what extent realism should be metaphysically informed. On the one hand, if the realist eschews metaphysics she runs the risk of being accused of doing little more than regurgitating the relevant science; but on the other, if she accepts too much she runs the kind of epistemic risk associated with metaphysical ...
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Metaphysical Realism and Internal Realism
2001All of us agree that some sentences are true and some are false. We further agree that the truth values of sentences are determined by two factors: language and reality. The truth of ‘Mount Everest is higher than Mont Blanc’ is due partly to the meanings of the expressions occurring in it, partly to the way things in fact are.
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Metaphysical Realism and Castañeda’s Minimal Transcendental Realism
2014Rilettura del realismo metafisico alla luce della concezione metafisica di Castaneda. Questo articolo è pubblcato anche in Bonino. G. Jesson, J. Cumpa, Defending Realism. Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2014, pp. 235-246.
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A Form of Metaphysical Realism
The Philosophical Quarterly, 1995L'A. defend la these selon laquelle le realisme interne que Putnam oppose au realisme metaphysique se rapproche d'une certaine forme d'idealisme, ou la theorie de la verite se definit en termes epistemologiques. L'A. prend parti pour l'interpretation semantique de la theorie de la verite developpee par D.
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The Case for Metaphysical Realism
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2002L'A. defend une version modeste du realisme metaphysique, fondee sur la notion de dependance de l'esprit. Examinant les arguments antirealistes concernant le statut ou la structure ontologique de l'activite mentale, l'A. met en evidence l'ambiguite des lectures triviale et non-triviale de la these de la dependance de l'esprit chez Berkeley.
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An Argument For Metaphysical Realism
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2004This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve.
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