Results 11 to 20 of about 53,332 (166)
Visual Perspectives in Episodic Memory and the Sense of Self
Frontiers in Psychology, 2018 The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience ...
Ying-Tung Lin
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Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 2018 This paper sketches a new and empirically testable theory about what "pure consciousness" or the simplest form of phenomenal experience is.
openaire +4 more sources
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Neurophenomenology – The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators
Frontiers in Psychology, 2020 This paper is a practical guide to neurophenomenology. Varela’s neurophenomenological research program (NRP) aspires to bridge the gap between, and integrate, first-person (1P) and third-person (3P) approaches to understanding the mind.
Aviva Berkovich-Ohana +14 more
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
, 2016 The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
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BMC Health Services Research, 2020 Background Despite progress recently, Ethiopia remains one of the largest contributors to the global burden of maternal deaths. As facility-based childbirth and skilled-birth attendant at birth reduces maternal morbidity and mortality, the country has ...
Kerebih Asrese
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Does Integrated Information Lack Subjectivity [PDF]
, 2018 I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness.
Nešić, Janko
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Minimal Self-Models and the Free Energy Principle
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2013 The term "minimal phenomenal selfhood" describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body ...
Jakub eLimanowski +3 more
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On what we experience when we hear people speak [PDF]
, 2016 According to perceptualism, fluent comprehension of speech is a perceptual achievement, in as much as it is akin to such high-level perceptual states as the perception of objects as cups or trees, or of people as happy or sad.
Nes, Anders
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On the Possibility of Hallucinations [PDF]
, 2020 Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false.
Masrour, Farid
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Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity [PDF]
, 2020 A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience.
Chasid, Alon, Weksler, Assaf
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