Results 41 to 50 of about 53,332 (166)

Dennett’s Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness [PDF]

, 2010
It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind.
Sytsma, Justin
core   +1 more source

Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness [PDF]

, 2018
The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett.
Mandik, Pete
core   +1 more source

Kant on Bullshit Jobs—Mere Means and True Means

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Following David Graeber's Bullshit Jobs, there has recently been academic and public discussion about useless work. Immanuel Kant maintains that we ought to be means for others and that there is a duty to be useful. Graeber and Kant are both concerned with a form of harm often overlooked in contemporary ethics and political philosophy, namely,
Martin Sticker
wiley   +1 more source

Metaphysics and Contemporary Science: Why the question of the synthetic a priori shouldn’t not be abandoned prematurely [PDF]

, 2020
The problem of synthetic judgements touches on the question of whether philosophy can draw independent statements about reality in the first place. For Kant, the synthetic judgements a priori formulate the conditions of the possibility for objectively ...
Herrmann, Kay
core  

Slow switching and the psychology of memory

Mind &Language, EarlyView.
This article presents elements of a theory of the representational contents of episodic memory and a new perspective on the relationship between memory and self‐knowledge. These two interrelated outcomes fall out of a novel naturalistic treatment of the debate concerning the compatibility between semantic externalism and a priori self‐knowledge.
Jay Richardson
wiley   +1 more source

Minimal phenomenal experience and the synthetic data hypothesis

Minimal Phenomenal Experience (MPE) refers to the simplest form of conscious experience, characterized by the absence of time, self, and sensory content, where only pure awareness or consciousness remains. In this paper, we present a com- putational neurophenomenological account of minimal phenomenal experience within the active inference framework. We
George Deane, Daphne Demekas
openaire   +1 more source

A Case against Representationalism [PDF]

, 2013
The case of blurry vision has been cited by many as a counterexample to representationalism in the theory of perception. Specifically, it is claimed that the phenomenon of blurry vision is incompatible with the supervenience thesis which is at ...
Chasid, Alon
core  

Taxonomising the senses [PDF]

, 2010
I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ...
Macpherson, F.
core   +1 more source

Agnosticism about artificial consciousness

Mind &Language, EarlyView.
Could an AI have conscious experiences? Answers to this question should be based not on intuition, dogma or speculation but on solid scientific evidence. However, I argue such evidence is hard to come by and that the only justifiable stance is agnosticism.
Tom McClelland
wiley   +1 more source

The *subjectivity* of subjective experience - A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective [PDF]

, 2000
This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive.
Metzinger, Thomas
core   +1 more source