Results 51 to 60 of about 53,332 (166)

Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved.
Gerrans, Philip, Letheby, Chris
core   +2 more sources

Did I have a dream last night? White dreaming as metacognitive feelings

open access: yesMind &Language, EarlyView.
While most research on sleep mentation focuses on dream reports, sleep experiences can also include reports lacking content, such as white dreaming—the feeling of knowing one dreamt but being unable to recall its contents. I claim that white dreaming is a metacognitive feeling, akin to tip‐of‐the‐tongue and déjà experiences.
Adriana Alcaraz Sánchez
wiley   +1 more source

Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia ...
Pautz, Adam
core  

Is the sense-data theory a representationalist theory? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
Is the sense-data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism, a form of representationalism? This question has been underexplored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is discussion, contemporary authors disagree.
Macpherson, Fiona
core   +1 more source

Unstructured Purity

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a significant (if sometimes implicit) role in metaphysical theorizing. A philosopher will argue that a fact [p]$[p]$ contains a derivative entity and cite Purity as a reason to deny that [p]$[p]$ is fundamental. I argue that recent
Samuel Z. Elgin
wiley   +1 more source

Phenomenal Contrast Arguments: What they Achieve [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience, that certain contents are represented in experience and that kinds of sui generis ...
Jorba, Marta, Vicente, Agustín
core   +1 more source

A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self‐Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I defend the non‐instrumentalist thesis that every adult member of a political society has a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say in determining the content of the laws to which she is subject. I begin by giving an account of an important kind of servility that has received only glancing notice in philosophical ...
Shruta Swarup
wiley   +1 more source

Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception [PDF]

open access: yes, 2018
Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are
Cavedon-Taylor, Dan
core   +1 more source

Contingent Grounding Physicalism

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie ...
Alex Moran
wiley   +1 more source

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities.
Schellenberg, Susanna
core  

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