Results 61 to 70 of about 53,332 (166)
Experience Does Justify Belief [PDF]
, 2014 According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say that perception is a source of justification for beliefs about the external world.
Silins, Nicholas
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Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?
Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper analyzes and objects to the anti‐skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher‐order justification or active defense of the justification ...
Guido Tana
wiley +1 more source
Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach [PDF]
, 2001 This essay is a sustained information-theoretic attempt to bring new light on some of the perennial problems in the philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection.
Aydede, Murat, Guven, Guzeldere
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Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach
Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way.
David Builes +1 more
wiley +1 more source
The Entropy–Content Paradox in Minimal Phenomenal Experience
Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) present a paradox for theories of consciousness.Defined by phenomenological simplicity, they are nonetheless accompanied by unexpectedly highneural signal diversity. Traditionally, entropy has been interpreted as a marker ofphenomenological richness, exemplified by psychedelic states.
Jonas Mago, Shamil Chandaria
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Only Friends, Despite the Rumors: Philosophy of Mind's Consciousness and Intentionality [PDF]
, 2012 Being evasive as it is, philosophers have often tried to do without consciousness. Despite this, it has played a key role in the endeavours of philosophy of mind, as witnessed by its reputation as a "mark of the mental" and works of philosophers like ...
Chartrand, Louis
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The Gradability of ‘Conscious’
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective, meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f ...
Andrew Y. Lee, Poppy Mankowitz
wiley +1 more source
How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley +1 more source
Abstract Minimal phenomenal experiences (MPE) provide a distinctive entry point for investigating consciousness and understanding how certain meditative practices may represent and contribute to human flourishing. Adopting a neurophenomenological stance, we combine first-person phenomenology with formal whole-brain modeling to ask what ...
Jakub Vohryzek +7 more
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Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation [PDF]
, 2016 Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines.
Haladjian, Harry Haroutioun +1 more
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