Results 101 to 110 of about 413 (173)

“The Excuses We Make”: Defining Eight Corruption Rationalization Categories

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The rationalization of corruption allows individuals to detach from moral imperatives, enabling them to perceive unethical or unlawful actions as acceptable or justifiable. Closely linked to the concept of moral disengagement, rationalization involves cognitive distortions that frame inhumane or immoral behavior as neither wrong nor ...
Caio César Coelho Rodrigues
wiley   +1 more source

Parental emotional adjustment as a primary target for parenting programs: a cross-sectional study. [PDF]

open access: yesBMC Psychol
LaMonica HM   +7 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Tightening the Regulatory Grip: Local Regulatory Stringency and Sectoral Platform Regulation in EU Cities

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Platform companies like Uber and Airbnb are depicted as agile policy entrepreneurs who can navigate the boundaries of regulatory frameworks and manipulate regulations to their advantage; however, recent empirical studies suggest that their capacity to influence policy depends on the particular political and institutional context.
Eliska Drapalova, Kai Wegrich
wiley   +1 more source

When Business Breaks the Rules: The Value of a Criminology‐Informed “Organizational” Perspective for the Regulation of White‐Collar and Corporate Crimes

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This article argues that if the aspiration is to enhance regulatory and governance responses to white‐collar and corporate crimes, consideration of the organization of these offending behaviors must be central to the scholarly, practice, and policy discussion.
Nicholas Lord, Michael Levi
wiley   +1 more source

IMF Conditionality on Corruption: The Politics of Good Governance

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We offer a systematic analysis of IMF loan conditionality on corruption and argue that the Fund's pursuit of anti‐corruption measures is tempered by two political costs. First, because corruption is politically sensitive, the IMF risks destabilizing recipient governments and provoking crises.
Merih Angin   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Certainty, Severity, or Celerity? A Mixed‐Effects Analysis of Corruption and Deterrence in the European Union

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Deterrence theory underpins numerous anti‐corruption interventions. Yet, empirical evidence on its application to corruption remains limited. Existing studies rely mainly on laboratory experiments and focus on certainty and severity of punishment, leaving the role of celerity unexplored.
Eran Itskovich   +4 more
wiley   +1 more source

Does Corruption Increase Inequality? Evidence From a European Fact‐Based Assessment

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether government favoritism in public procurement generates negative social costs, even within redistributive institutional frameworks such as the European Union. Rather than relying on perception‐based corruption indicators, we employ an objective proxy of corruption risk—the share of awarded public contracts which ...
Iva Parvanova, Alina Mungiu‐Pippidi
wiley   +1 more source

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