Results 141 to 150 of about 2,234,689 (207)

Pass‐Through and Tax Incidence in Differentiated Mixed Duopoly With Managerial Delegation

The American journal of economics and sociology
This article explores how managerial delegation affects pass‐through and tax incidence in a mixed Cournot duopoly. It finds that the delegation coefficient of the private firm's manager is positive, while the coefficient of public firm's manager is ...
Di Wu, Leonard F. S. Wang
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Privatization Versus Managerial Delegation: Revisiting Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly

Managerial and Decision Economics
This study revisits the issue of managerial delegation in a mixed oligopoly by focusing on whether a private firm's managerial delegation can increase firm profit and social welfare.
Kojun Hamada, Hideya Kato
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly when a public firm supplies its private competitor

Applied Economics Letters
We examine endogenous timing in a quantity setting mixed duopoly where a public firm, in addition to selling a good in the retail market, manufactures an input required to produce this good and supplies it to its private retail competitor.
Jorge Fernández-Ruiz
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Organizational Form and Excess Burden of Taxation in Multiproduct Mixed Duopoly

, 2021
By introducing the excess burden of taxation, we analyze endogenous choice of organizational form between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly.
Kangsik Choi
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Corporate social responsibility and tariff policy in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Bulletin of Economic Research
In this paper, we assume that the domestic public firm competes in the market with a foreign private firm that cares about consumer surplus and the domestic government imposes tariffs on foreign firm.
Xingtang Wang, Leonard F. S. Wang
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly

Journal of Public Economics, 1998
Abstract We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm.
openaire   +1 more source

Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

Review of Industrial Organization, 1996
If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is “small”.
Kenneth George, Manfredi M. A. La Manna
openaire   +1 more source

MARKETING COOPERATIVES IN MIXED DUOPOLIES

Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1995
This paper analyses a market in which agents with different ownership structures compete with each other by simultaneously choosing quantities. In the first part of the paper, the government can choose to support the formation of a marketing cooperative by a group of farmers, or to establish a public marketing firm. The resulting market structures will
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MIXED DUOPOLY, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND COMPETITION*

The Manchester School, 2012
We examine the relationship between the equilibrium price and the degree of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly in which a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximizing private firm. Existing works on private economy show that increased product differentiation mitigates price competition.
MINORU KITAHARA, TOSHIHIRO MATSUMURA
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ON COURNOT-BERTRAND MIXED DUOPOLIES*

The Japanese Economic Review, 1996
This paper deals with a situation where a quantity-setting Coumot firm and a price-setting Bertrand firm coexist in the same industry. Under a set of regularity conditions on demand and cost, we compute equilibrium prices on Cournot-Bertrand “mixed” duopolies, and compare them with those of “pure” Cournot and Bertrand duopolies.
openaire   +1 more source