Results 41 to 50 of about 1,218 (204)

Random Carbon Tax Policy and Investment Into Emission Abatement Technologies

Mathematical Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We analyze the problem of a profit‐maximizing electricity producer, subject to carbon taxes, who decides on investments into CO2$\rm CO_2$ abatement technologies. We assume that the carbon tax policy is random and that the investment in the abatement technology is divisible, irreversible, and subject to transaction costs.
Katia Colaneri, Rüdiger Frey, Verena Köck   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

THE MIXED STRATEGIES OF COOPERATION AND THE GENERALIZED LEADERSHIP FOR OUTPUTS OF SYMMETRIC DUOPOLY

Міжнародний науково-технічний журнал "Проблеми керування та інформатики", 2007
It is shown that use of the generalized leadership Stackelberg strategy instead of traditional competition Cournot–Nash strategy allows resolution of the classical paradox known as the prisoner’s dilemma.
V.M. Gorbachuk
doaj   +1 more source

Mutual Outsourcing in a Vertically Related Market With Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility

The Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study considers mutual outsourcing firms in a vertically related market and examines their strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) activities. We demonstrate that ECSR adoption reduces mutual outsourcing firms' profits, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma situation, but enhances welfare regardless of ...
Lili Xu, Xinying Fan, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model

Journal of Economics, 2014
Xunta de Galicia ...
openaire   +3 more sources

Regulatory Context and Bureaucratic Policy Making: Illustrations From Payment System Regulation in Brazil

Regulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study investigates how bureaucratic strategies for structuring the policy environment shape regulatory outcomes, focusing on the extent to which agencies achieve their original policy preferences. Drawing on resource dependence theory and bureaucratic politics, we conceptualize the policy environment in two dimensions: internal ...
João Pedro Haddad, Lauro Emilio Gonzalez   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Consumers' Environmental Awareness and Firms' Managerial Delegation Contracts Under Emission Tax Policies

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study considers consumers' environmental awareness of polluting firms' managerial delegation contracts and compares the effects of committed and time‐consistent emission tax policies. It reveals that when environmental performance (EP) incentives prevail, sales performance (SP) incentives depend on the emission tax type and competition ...
Lili Xu, Yuntong Yin, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Lifetime Employment and a Sequential Choice in a Mixed Duopoly Market with a Joint-Stock Firm [PDF]

International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2016
This paper examines a three-stage game model in which a joint-stock private firm and a state-owned public firm can sequentially offer lifetime employment before competing in quantities. The game runs as follows.
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
doaj  

A timing game in a mixed duopoly

SERIEs, 2023
AbstractThis paper investigates a timing game in a mixed duopoly, whereby a relatively inefficient state-owned firm maximizing the linear combination of its profit and social welfare competes against a relatively efficient, profit-maximizing private firm over the timing of entry.
openaire   +2 more sources

Circular economy business strategies and public schemes: a game theory‐based survey

International Transactions in Operational Research, Volume 33, Issue 5, Page 2827-2869, September 2026.
Abstract This paper develops a selected survey based on game theory in circular economy (CE) by complementing two perspectives: the CE business strategies and the public schemes (PS) available to implement CE systems. These perspectives are concentrated in six CE business strategies (circular inputs, sharing platforms, product‐as‐a‐service (PaaS ...
Vinay Ramani, Pietro De Giovanni
wiley   +1 more source

The Optimal Bribe: Price Versus Quantity Competition in Oligopolies

The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 4, Page 378-397, July 2026.
ABSTRACT We analyze an entry deterrence model between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, where the incumbent strategically offers bribes to local officials to raise entry barriers. Our focus is a three‐stage Bertrand game under incomplete information in a differentiated goods market.
Vishavdeep Sharma, Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source