Results 11 to 20 of about 8,261 (256)
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Bhaskar, V., Damme, E.E.C. van
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Measuring Moral Hazard Behaviour and its Determinants Within Credit Installment
Non performing loans (NPL) is an indicator of debtor’s inability in credit repayment which indicates the presence of asymmetric information that might cause moral hazard.
Agus Arifin, FX. Sugiyanto, Wahyu Widodo
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Credit rating agencies and moral hazard [PDF]
The failure of credit rating agencies to properly assess risks of complex financial securities was instrumental in setting off the global financial crisis.
Božović Miloš +2 more
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Moral Hazard Under Ambiguity [PDF]
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Thibaut Mastrolia, Dylan Possamaï
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Altruism, moral hazard, and sharecropping
The paper provides a new explanation for the emergence of sharecropping in agriculture. Under the principal-agent moral hazard framework, the choice of the agrarian land lease contracts is discussed from the perspective of behavioural economics.
Jiancai PI
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Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
This history of moral hazard in health insurance shows that this concept is different from how moral hazard is understood in economics outside of health. Health economists are divided on their understanding and conceptualization of moral hazard in health
Michel Grignon +4 more
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The Impact of Moral Hazard on Capital Structure [PDF]
On the basis of Pecking Order Theory, when firms need resourcesthey usually rely on debts since capital is considered expensive due toinformation asymmetry.
S. A. Khalifeh Soltani, S. Khajavi
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Overconfidence and moral hazard [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Unlike conventional banking, theoretically, Islamic banking has unique system called profit and loss sharing based financing which ensure both parties in the same level. But, in fact, some cases moral hazard has been occur in Islamic banking.
Indah Piliyanti, Afrilianti Afrilianti
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AbstractWe reexamine the ability of teams to credibly self‐impose group punishments and prevent free riding when individual inputs are unobservable. We formulate self‐imposed group punishments as performance underreporting by the team. Although underreporting is not credible in a static game, we show that simple strategies can sustain underreporting in
Bisetti, Emilio +2 more
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