Results 211 to 220 of about 1,348,779 (245)
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Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

The American Economic Review
While many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—
Hector Chade
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

, 2019
Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the ...
Shenan Wu, B. Goodwin, Keith H. Coble
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Moral Hazard in Pediatrics

The American Journal of Bioethics, 2016
"Moral hazard" is a term familiar in economics and business ethics that illuminates why rational parties sometimes choose decisions with bad moral outcomes without necessarily intending to behave selfishly or immorally. The term is not generally used in medical ethics.
Michaelson, Christopher   +1 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Decomposition of moral hazard

Journal of Health Economics, 2018
This study seeks to simulate the portion of moral hazard that is due to the income transfer contained in the coinsurance price reduction. Healthcare spending of uninsured individuals from the MEPS with a priority health condition is compared with the predicted counterfactual spending of those same individuals if they were insured with either (1) a ...
Helen Markelova Trenz   +4 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Moral Hazard With Unawareness

Rationality and Society, 2008
The article introduces unawareness of actions into the standard moral hazard model in contract theory. We allow the contracting party (the principal or the agent) to be unaware of his or the other party's actions. The principal may also have an incorrect belief about the awareness of the agent.
openaire   +3 more sources

Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard

Operational Research, 2018
Linear contracts and their variants are quite popular in practice, for example, salesforce incentives and chief executive officer compensation. However, agency theory typically stipulates complex contract forms.
Yimin Yu, Xiangyi Kong
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Moral Hazard

2015
This Chapter briefly evaluates the moral hazard of writing this book or the knowledge of a solution to mass human starvation may make people less motivated to reduce risks related to nuclear war and global climate change.
David Denkenberger, Joshua M. Pearce
openaire   +2 more sources

The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises

International Organization, 2018
A large literature has established that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is heavily politicized. We argue that this politicization has important consequences for international reserve accumulation and financial crises. The IMF generates moral hazard
Phillip Y. Lipscy, H. Lee
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard, an Empirical Study

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2018
Markets prone to asymmetric information employ reputation mechanisms to address adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper, we use a change in such a reputation mechanism to examine its effect on improving adverse selection and moral hazard.
Xiang Hui, M. Saeedi, Neel Sundaresan
semanticscholar   +1 more source

A moral solution to the moral hazard problem

Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2008
Abstract In agency theory, offering a flat salary contract under unobservable effort creates a moral hazard problem because the agent is motivated to shirk and provide less than a previously agreed-upon level of effort. We examine a moral solution to this moral hazard problem.
Alex Thevaranjan, Douglas E. Stevens
openaire   +3 more sources

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