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Some Circumstances Under Which It Is Rational for Human Agents Not to Trust Artificial Agents

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In this paper, I argue that there are several different circumstances in which it is rational for human agents not to trust artificial agents (such as ChatGPT). I claim that artificial agents cannot, in principle, be programmed with their own self (nor a
Jeff Buechner
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A little good is good enough: Ethical consumption, cheap excuses, and moral self-licensing.

PLoS ONE, 2020
This paper explores the role of cheap excuses in product choice. If agents feel that they fulfill one ethical aspect, they may care less about other independent ethical facets within product choice. Choosing a product that fulfills one ethical aspect may
Jannis Engel, Nora Szech
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Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck [PDF]

, 2019
How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution.
Mickelson, Kristin M.
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One Desire Too Many [PDF]

, 2021
I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of ...
Howard, Nathan Robert
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Fair unemployment compensation and the target for egalitarian concerns

Etikk i Praksis: Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 2010
If we want to make people more equal, what should we make them more equal in? For example, should it be resources, such as income, or should it be subjective well-being, such as preference satisfaction?
Cornelius Cappelen
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Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle [PDF]

, 2013
Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions, bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers.
Imhof, Lorens, Kräkel, Matthias
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Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck [PDF]

, 2020
Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice.
Hartman, Robert J.
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Inadvertence and Moral Responsibility [PDF]

Ideas y Valores, 2009
Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently.
Harry Frankfurt
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Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility [PDF]

, 2018
Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything.
Hartman, Robert J.
core  

Why We Should Negatively Discount the Well-Being of Future Generations

Journal of Practical Ethics
Traditionally, the discounting debate has been dominated by those who advocate equality between generational interests and those who think future generations’ interests should be discounted at some positive rate. This paper argues for a novel view:
Matthew Price
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