Results 231 to 240 of about 30,902 (286)
Although Early Modern male philosophers arguably moved away from virtue ethics toward theories of obligation, it is less clearly true of women philosophers of that period. I argue that Early Modern women philosophers in France and England mixed elements from virtue ethics and theories of moral obligation in order to theorize their moral experience.
Bergès, Sandrine
openaire +3 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
The moral psychology of obligation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2019Abstract Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which ...
openaire +2 more sources
On the moral obligation of the scientist
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1952With his customary lucidity and directness of expression. Dr. Einstein here examines the question whether scientific inquiry should be pursued as an autonomous object or subordinated to some “practical” end. He argues that the choice—which cannot be decided on a logical basis—”will have considerable influence upon our thinking and our moral judgment ...
openaire +1 more source
Rationality and moral obligation
Synthese, 1987Rationality is (“by definition,” as it were) a matter of seeking optimal (best available) resolutions to the problems we face in life. It consists in the intelligent pursuit of appropriate objectives. It impels us to act for the best. Does this mean that rationality requires people to be good?
openaire +1 more source
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2004
Moral philosophy characteristically sees moral standards as reasons. That an action would be kind or just or in some way morally admirable is supposed to give us a reason for performing it. And surely there is something right about the thought that moral standards imply reasons for conforming to them.
openaire +1 more source
Moral philosophy characteristically sees moral standards as reasons. That an action would be kind or just or in some way morally admirable is supposed to give us a reason for performing it. And surely there is something right about the thought that moral standards imply reasons for conforming to them.
openaire +1 more source
2016
Using Roger Crisp's [1] arguments for well-being as the ultimate source of moral reasoning, this paper argues that there are no ultimate, non-derivative reasons to program robots with moral concepts such as moral obligation, morally wrong or morally right.
openaire +1 more source
Using Roger Crisp's [1] arguments for well-being as the ultimate source of moral reasoning, this paper argues that there are no ultimate, non-derivative reasons to program robots with moral concepts such as moral obligation, morally wrong or morally right.
openaire +1 more source
Enhancements Are a Moral Obligation
2009Abstract If it wasn ‘t good for you it wouldn ‘t be enhancement. In terms of human functioning an enhancement is by definition an improvement on what went before. Not necessarily, as we shall see, an improvement on normal species functioning or species typical functioning, nor are enhancements justifled, as many seem to believe ...
openaire +2 more sources
2018
In this chapter, I examine the effects consent has on our moral obligations. In particular, I address three questions: (1) Whose obligations are affected by a person’s consent? It is uncontroversial that consent changes the normative situation of the agent to whom it is given. But can it also create a new obligation for the person giving it?
openaire +2 more sources
In this chapter, I examine the effects consent has on our moral obligations. In particular, I address three questions: (1) Whose obligations are affected by a person’s consent? It is uncontroversial that consent changes the normative situation of the agent to whom it is given. But can it also create a new obligation for the person giving it?
openaire +2 more sources
2002
Abstract Examines four principle questions about moral obligation raised by key philosophers: (1) Plato asks in The Republic ‘Will a man be better off for doing his duty?’; (2) Plato then asks ‘Ought man to do his duty?’; (3) we may also ask ‘What is the criterion of a duty?’; and (4) we may ask ‘What is moral obligation?’ Rejecting the ...
openaire +1 more source
Abstract Examines four principle questions about moral obligation raised by key philosophers: (1) Plato asks in The Republic ‘Will a man be better off for doing his duty?’; (2) Plato then asks ‘Ought man to do his duty?’; (3) we may also ask ‘What is the criterion of a duty?’; and (4) we may ask ‘What is moral obligation?’ Rejecting the ...
openaire +1 more source

