Results 201 to 210 of about 2,621 (263)
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2021
Abstract Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral realism can be confusing, as he draws upon multiple categories that are often in tension in contemporary discussions of moral reality. This chapter lays out three frameworks Niebuhr used to discuss moral reality: naturalism, moral ideals, and divine nature and command. It argues that these frameworks are
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Abstract Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral realism can be confusing, as he draws upon multiple categories that are often in tension in contemporary discussions of moral reality. This chapter lays out three frameworks Niebuhr used to discuss moral reality: naturalism, moral ideals, and divine nature and command. It argues that these frameworks are
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2023
Abstract Moral realists hold that there are moral facts and that some moral claims are objectively true. This view is supported by intuition, which defeasibly justifies our belief in a wide variety of such facts. To be sure, this justification could be defeated, if there were compelling reason to be skeptical about the very existence of ...
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Abstract Moral realists hold that there are moral facts and that some moral claims are objectively true. This view is supported by intuition, which defeasibly justifies our belief in a wide variety of such facts. To be sure, this justification could be defeated, if there were compelling reason to be skeptical about the very existence of ...
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2018
Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims.
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Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims.
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2003
AbstractThis is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics.
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AbstractThis is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics.
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Moral Realism and Indeterminacy
Noûs, 2002Abstract The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no
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Shakespeare, Moral Judgments, and Moral Realism
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015Among the many areas of scholarship that can be enriched through an engagement with Shakespeare’s plays, moral philosophy is a particularly fruitful territory. In the present essay, I draw on a couple of Shakespearean tragedies to come to grips with a challenge that has sometimes been mounted against moral realism. Moral realism I take to be the thesis
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Moral relativism is moral realism
Philosophical Studies, 2014I begin by describing my relation with Nicholas Sturgeon and his objections to things I have said about moral explanations. Then I turn to issues about moral relativism. One of these is whether a plausible version of moral relativism can be formulated as a claim about the logical form of certain moral judgments.
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1993
Abstract Granted that it is correct to reply to a moral utterance by saying ‘That’s true’ or ‘That’s not true’, the question remains of what sort of assessment is indicated by these responses. Dummett, with whose paper this emphasis is associated, also says that a statement is false if a state of affairs obtains such that a man asserting
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Abstract Granted that it is correct to reply to a moral utterance by saying ‘That’s true’ or ‘That’s not true’, the question remains of what sort of assessment is indicated by these responses. Dummett, with whose paper this emphasis is associated, also says that a statement is false if a state of affairs obtains such that a man asserting
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