Results 261 to 270 of about 222,431 (310)

Moral relativism is moral realism

Philosophical Studies, 2014
I begin by describing my relation with Nicholas Sturgeon and his objections to things I have said about moral explanations. Then I turn to issues about moral relativism. One of these is whether a plausible version of moral relativism can be formulated as a claim about the logical form of certain moral judgments.
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Moral Realism

1993
Abstract Granted that it is correct to reply to a moral utterance by saying ‘That’s true’ or ‘That’s not true’, the question remains of what sort of assessment is indicated by these responses. Dummett, with whose paper this emphasis is associated, also says that a statement is false if a state of affairs obtains such that a man asserting
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Moral Progress Without Moral Realism

Philosophical Papers, 2010
Abstract This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features ...
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Morality, Moralism, and Realism

2008
Abstract There may have been a time, perhaps at the peak of Victorian self-esteem in the English-speaking countries, when morality generally occupied an unquestioned place at the top of a hierarchy of social and personal values. Indeed, as the high tide of Christian religious influence began to ebb in Europe, morality itself as a sort of
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Evolutionary moral realism

Biological Theory, 2012
John Collier, Michael Stingl
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Moral realism and moral judgments

Erkenntnis, 1992
For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
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Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma

The Journal of Philosophy, 1983
Abstract Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation ...
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Moral Realism

Abstract A metaphysics-first treatment of the concepts of some domain treats the metaphysics of entities of that domain as prior in the order of philosophical explanation to grasp of concepts of that domain. This conception can be implemented for moral concepts if grasp of moral properties is treated as involving tacit, often partial ...
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Moral realism and anti-realism

2018
This chapter deals with various issues and debates pertaining to moral realism. Realism positions are themselves quite diverse, and are typically divided into versions of naturalism and non-naturalism. One version of anti-realism holds that there simply are no moral facts at all.
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Moral Realism Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument

2011
Moral realism stands for the idea that there are some moral claims that are true in a certain way. Their truth does not depend on the attitudes that anyone takes towards their content. Theological realism is simply theism: the view that God exists. In this chapter, the God refers to the traditional God of Western monotheism: an omniscient, omnipotent ...
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