Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority [PDF]
, 2019 We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members.
Agranov, Marina +2 more
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Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games [PDF]
Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games by Pavlo Prokopovych and Lones Smith ABSTRACT This paper investigates discounted infinitely repeated games with observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device.
Lones Smith, Pavlo Prokopovych
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Laryngoscope Investigative Otolaryngology, Volume 11, Issue 2, April 2026.
Jarrett M. Jackson +2 more
wiley +1 more source
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games [PDF]
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David K Levine, Drew Fudenberg
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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case [PDF]
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players
Francoise Forges, Péter Vida
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Correlated equilibria and communication in games. [PDF]
Analyse bayésienne; Théorie des jeux; Information privée;
Forges, Françoise
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Should I remember more than you? - On the best response to factor-based strategies - [PDF]
In this paper we offer a new approach to modeling strategies of bounded complexity, the so-called factor-based strategies. In our model, the strategy of a player in the multi-stage game does not directly map the set of histories to the set of her actions.
Abraham Neyman +2 more
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Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames [PDF]
Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1994.Game Theory;
Selten, Reinhard
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OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES [PDF]
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other.
Abraham Neyman +2 more
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Comparison of Affect and Cardiorespiratory Training Responses Between Structured Gym Activities and Traditional Aerobic Exercise in Children [PDF]
, 2016 International Journal of Exercise Science 9(1): 16-25, 2016. Physical activities (PA) that are pleasurable are likely to be repeated. Structured gym activities (SGA) are defined as dodging, chasing, and fleeing games.
Goss, Fredric L. +3 more
core +1 more source