Results 11 to 20 of about 205,129 (73)
Multiwinner Elections With Diversity Constraints
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018 We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based measures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the committee members) with diversity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the candidates have certain attributes (such as being a male or a female, being junior or senior, etc.) and ...
Lackner, Martin +4 more
core +10 more sources
Paradoxical oddities in two multiwinner elections from Scotland [PDF]
The Mathematical Gazette, 2023 Ranked-choice voting anomalies such as monotonicity paradoxes have been extensively studied through creating hypothetical examples and generating elections under various models of voter behavior. However, very few real-world examples of such voting paradoxes have been found and analyzed.
Graham-Squire, Adam, McCune, David
openaire +3 more sources
The maximin support method: an extension of the D’Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections [PDF]
Mathematical Programming, 2021 AbstractWe propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D’Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is a sequential procedure that aims to maximize the voter support of the least supported elected candidate.
Sánchez-Fernández, L +3 more
core +10 more sources
Multiwinner Elections and the Spoiler Effect [PDF]
In the popular debate over the use of ranked-choice voting, it is often claimed that the method of single transferable vote (STV) is immune or mostly immune to the so-called ``spoiler effect,'' where the removal of a losing candidate changes the set of winners. This claim has previously been studied only in the single-winner case.
McCune, David, Wilson, Jennifer
core +4 more sources
Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023 In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each party can be assigned multiple seats.
Théo Delemazure +4 more
core +5 more sources
Fairly Allocating Utility in Constrained Multiwinner Elections
CoRR, 2022 13 pages (2-column), 3 ...
Relia, Kunal
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Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule [PDF]
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021 We consider the algorithmic question of choosing a subset of candidates of a given size $k$ from a set of $m$ candidates, with knowledge of voters' ordinal rankings over all candidates. We consider the well-known and classic scoring rule for achieving diverse representation: the Chamberlin-Courant (CC) or $1$-Borda rule, where the score of a committee ...
Kamesh Munagala +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Simulating Multiwinner Voting Rules in Judgment Aggregation [PDF]
, 2022 We simulate voting rules for multiwinner elections in a model of judgment aggregation that distinguishes between rationality and feasibility constraints.
de Haan, R., Endriss, U., Chingoma, J.
core +3 more sources
Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2022 A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing from their top candidate along all paths in the tree. This notion was introduced by Demange (1982), and subsequently Trick (1989b) described an efficient algorithm for deciding if a given ...
Peters, Dominik +3 more
openaire +6 more sources
Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023 We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limited by a budget.
Bartosz Kusek +4 more
openaire +4 more sources