Results 51 to 60 of about 205,129 (73)
Multiwinner Elections Under Preferences That Are Single-Peaked on a Tree.
, 2016 Yu, L, Chan, H, Elkind, E
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On Coalitional Manipulation for Multiwinner Elections: Shortlisting [PDF]
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017 Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the most natural and simple voting rule in this scenario, l-Bloc (every voter approves l candidates).
Robert Bredereck +2 more
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The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality [PDF]
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017 We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein and is majoritarian in spirit. The second one, local stability, is introduced in this paper, and focuses on voter representation. The goal of this paper is to explore these two notions, their implications on
Haris Aziz +2 more
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DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections [PDF]
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022 The study of fairness in multiwinner elections focuses on settings where candidates have attributes. However, voters may also be divided into predefined populations under one or more attributes. The models that focus on candidate attributes alone may systematically under-represent smaller voter populations.
Relia, Kunal
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Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constraints
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023 We consider the multiwinner election problem where the goal is to choose a committee of $k$ candidates given the voters' utility functions. We allow arbitrary additional constraints on the chosen committee, and the utilities of voters to belong to a very general class of set functions called $β$-self bounding.
Kamesh Munagala
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Multiwinner Elections under Minimax Chamberlin-Courant Rule in Euclidean Space
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022 We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a d-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of k candidates so that the rank of any voter's most preferred candidate in the committee is minimized.
Jie Xue
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Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints on Individual Preferences
Revue D'Economie PolitiqueWe address the problem of selecting a committee of a specified size from a given set of candidates, where individuals are requested to provide their preferences in the form of linear rankings of the candidates. In this framework, the selection of a committee depends on the multiwinner voting rule, also known as the committee selection rule.
Marc Deschamps
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The Complexity of Cloning Candidates in Multiwinner Elections
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020We initiate the study of cloning in multiwinner elections, focusing on single-transferable vote (STV), single-nontransferable vote (SNTV), bloc, k-Borda, t-approval-CC, and Borda-CC. Transferring the model of cloning due to Elkind et al. [15] from single-winner to multiwinner elections, we consider decision problems describing possible and necessary ...
Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe
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Understanding the Impact of Proportionality in Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial IntelligenceDespite extensive theoretical research on proportionality in approval-based multiwinner voting, its impact on which committees and candidates can be selected in practice remains poorly understood. We address this gap by (i) analyzing the computational complexity of several natural problems related to the behavior of proportionality axioms, and (ii ...
Niclas Boehmer
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Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015We study multiple referenda and committee elections, when the ballot of each voter is simply a set of approved binary issues (or candidates). Two well-known rules under this model are the commonly used candidate-wise majority, also called the minisum rule, as well as the minimax rule.
Georgios Amanatidis +4 more
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