Results 181 to 190 of about 50,466 (234)

Using a policy learning lens to understand health financing policy outcomes: the case of translating strategic health purchasing into policy and practice in Burkina Faso. [PDF]

BMJ Glob Health
Kiendrébéogo JA, De Allegri M, Van Damme W, Meessen B.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

How Do Copayment Coupons Affect Branded Drug Prices and Quantities Purchased? [PDF]

Am Econ J Econ Policy
Dafny L, Ho K, Kong E.
europepmc   +1 more source

The trading decision model of joint power market contain frequency/regulation/reserve. [PDF]

Sci Rep
Zhao H, Wang W, Li X.
europepmc   +1 more source

Impact of national volume-based procurement reform on the markup of pharmaceutical firms: an event study. [PDF]

Cost Eff Resour Alloc
Yan R, Miao Z, Cao F.
europepmc   +1 more source

Reconciled multiplicative relational two-stage network data envelopment analysis. [PDF]

MethodsX
Erturan MB.
europepmc   +1 more source

Maximizing Nash Social Welfare Based on Greedy Algorithm and Estimation of Distribution Algorithm. [PDF]

Biomimetics (Basel)
Liao W, Jin Y, Wang Z, Wang X, Xia X.
europepmc   +1 more source

Regulation of Privatized Public Service Systems. [PDF]

Prod Oper Manag
Hu M, Huang W, Liu C, Zhou W.
europepmc   +1 more source

Taxonomy of Cooperation and Reciprocity: Beyond Interdisciplinary Social Science Imperialism. [PDF]

Integr Psychol Behav Sci
Khalil EL.
europepmc   +1 more source

Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Related searches:

Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

Econometrica, 1975
A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash.
Kalai, Ehud, Smorodinsky, Meir
openaire   +3 more sources

“Nash-in-Nash” tariff bargaining

Journal of International Economics, 2020
Abstract We provide an equilibrium analysis of the efficiency properties of simultaneous bilateral tariff negotiations in a three-country model of international trade. We consider the setting in which discriminatory tariffs are allowed, and we utilize the “Nash-in-Nash” solution concept of Horn and Wolinsky (1988).
Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger, Ali Yurukoglu   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source