Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley +1 more source
Cross Ownership Versus Merger Under Product Differentiation
ABSTRACT We compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.
Arijit Mukherjee
wiley +1 more source
Correction: Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]
PLOS Computational Biology Staff.
europepmc +1 more source
Protecting Intermediate Innovations When Ideas Are Scarce: Patents or Secrecy?
ABSTRACT Patenting an intermediate research innovation can lead to competition for the development of a final commercial innovation and potentially induce wasteful duplicative R&D efforts. This study examines the effects of different protection strategies and patent life on the incentives to protect an intermediate innovation by considering a two‐stage
Bonwoo Koo, Jangho Yang, Brian D. Wright
wiley +1 more source
Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]
Ichijo H, Kawamura Y, Nakamura T.
europepmc +1 more source
Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium. [PDF]
Fudenberg D, Levine DK.
europepmc +1 more source
Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation
ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
wiley +1 more source
On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
Li J, Kendall G.
europepmc +1 more source
Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley +1 more source
Multi-resource constrained elective surgical scheduling with Nash equilibrium toward smart hospitals. [PDF]
Xue J, Li Z, Zhang S.
europepmc +1 more source

